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CAREMARK’S HIDDEN PROMISE 
Ezra Wasserman Mitchell 
          In re Caremark, decided in 1996, established for the first time a 
director’s duty to monitor under Delaware law. A significant amount of 
jurisprudence and commentary has developed. Almost all of this 
literature parses the language of the case and those following, and 
disregards the underlying claims for damages. As a result of this 
linguistic focus, many have concluded that the duty to monitor largely is 
toothless and, importantly, deals only with claims of failure to monitor 
legal risk. A duty to monitor business risk has been disavowed. 
          Following the money reveals a different story. Classifying the 
cases according to their damages claims reveals that, in fact, Delaware 
courts have gone far toward extending the duty to monitor to business 
risk, while at the same time doctrinally disavowing that they have done 
so. 
          Closely related to this monitoring duty is the pre-conditional duty 
of good faith, which is breached by directors’ knowledge of wrongdoing. 
Once again, doctrine masks important distinctions that are revealed by 
a close examination of the facts of the cases. Analysis reveals that 
Delaware courts may be failing to make an important distinction with 
regard to forms of notice. Making this distinction would help to shore up 
the duty to monitor without imposing unreasonable demands on 
directors. 
          These two lines of analysis lead to the conclusion that a meaningful 
duty to monitor both legal and business risk is well along in development. 
Extracting and reassembling the facts would realize Caremark’s original 
promise.  
 
  Professor of Law and Director, Commercial Law Center, Shanghai University of Finance 
and Economics. My thanks go to Stephen Bainbridge, Joel Friedlander, Kent Greenfield, Frank 
Partnoy, and Mark Poustie for insightful and helpful comments along the way. I am grateful for the 
excellent research assistance provided by Feng Tian Geng. This research is sponsored by “Common 
Law and Comparative Law” Innovation Program (No. 2016110396) of Shanghai University of 
Finance and Economics. 
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During the two decades following Chancellor William Allen’s 
important opinion in In re Caremark International, Inc.,1 judges have 
labored to make sense of its implications for the legal responsibilities 
of the board of directors in a variety of contexts.2 Interesting scholarly 
work has been done, from dismissals of the Caremark doctrine as 
having no real teeth to the celebration of its recognition of meaningful 
legal duties imposed on the board of directors.3 But, for several 
 
 1. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 2. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006); Wood v. 
Baum, 953 A.2d 136 (Del. 2008); Rich ex rel Fuqi Int’l v. Chong, 66 A.3d 963 (Del. Ch. 2013); 
Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re Citigroup Inc., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 
2009); In re The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. CIV.A. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 12, 2011); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. v. Greenberg, 965 A.2d 763 (Del. Ch. 2009); In re China 
Agritech, Inc., C.A. No. 7163-VCL, 2013 WL 2181514 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013); Melbourne Mun. 
Firefighters’ Pension Tr. Fund ex rel. Qualcomm, Inc. v. Jacobs, No. 10872-VCMR, 2016 WL 
4076369, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 2016), aff’d, 158 A.3d 449 (Del. 2017); In re The Dow Chemical 
Co. Derivative Litig., No. 4349-CC, 2010 WL 66769 (Del Ch. Jan. 11, 2010); Reiter v. Fairbank, 
No. 11693-CB, 2016 WL 6081823 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2016); In re Massey Energy Co., C.A. No. 
5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011); Sandys v. Pincus, No. 9512–CB, 2016 
WL 769999 (Del Ch. Feb. 29, 2016); Ironworkers Dist. Council of Phila. & Vicinity Ret. & Pension 
Plan v. Andreotti, C.A. No. 9714–VCG, 2015 WL 2270673 (Del. Ch. May 8, 2015); ATR-Kim 
Eng Fin. Corp. v. Araneta, No. CIV.A. 489-N, 2006 WL 3783520 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006). Other 
courts, applying Delaware law, have engaged in a similar struggle. 
 3. FRANK PARTNOY, DELAWARE AND FINANCIAL RISK (Steven Davidoff Solomon & 
Randall Thomas eds., 2017) (arguing that Caremark should be extended to cover financial risk); 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967 (2009) 
(evaluating the wisdom of extending Caremark claims to risk management); Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Star Lopez, and Benjamin Oklan, The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 559 (2008) [hereinafter Bainbridge et al., Convergence of Good Faith] (elucidating 
the relationship between oversight jurisprudence and good faith); Sean J. Griffith, Corporate 
Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075 (2016) (making a case that 
regulatory compliance regimes are overtaking and transforming corporate governance); Hillary A. 
Sale & Donald C. Langevoort, “We Believe”: Omnicare, Legal Risk Disclosure and Corporate 
Governance, 66 DUKE L.J. 763 (2016); Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 719 (2007) (praising Caremark for focusing boards on broader accountability);  
H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director’s Compliance Oversight Responsibility in the Post 
Caremark Era, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L 1 (2001) (evaluating board’s place in monitoring regulatory 
compliance); Martin Petrin, Assessing Delaware’s Oversight Jurisprudence: A Policy and Theory 
Perspective, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 433 (2011) (favoring Delaware’s restraint in imposing 
management accountability); Jennifer Arlen, The Story of Allis-Chalmers, Caremark, and 
Stone: The Directors’ Evolving Duty to Monitor in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 323, 344–45 (J. 
Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009) (providing an evolutionary account of oversight liability and its 
interplay with federal criminal law); Daniel S. Kleinberger, Delaware Dissolves the Glue of 
Capitalism: Exonerating from Claims of Incompetence Those Who Manage Other People’s Money, 
38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 737, 739 (2012) (observing a decay in managers’ personal 
responsibility under Delaware law and calling for a restoration); Robert T. Miller, The Board’s 
Duty to Monitor Risk after Citigroup, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1153 (2010) (making the case that 
extending Caremark is tantamount to repealing the business judgment rule). 
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reasons grounded in articulated Delaware doctrine, it is rare for a 
Caremark claim to pass the pleadings stage.4 
Two stand out among these reasons. First, the articulation of 
Caremark duties is limited to those circumstances in which corporate 
damages have resulted from the assessment of criminal and regulatory 
penalties as a consequence of corporate legal violations. As a doctrinal 
matter, Caremark jurisprudence has yet to expand to address losses 
caused by failed business decisions, which are the essence of the 
corporation’s reason for being. Second, the scienter-based “not in 
good faith” requirement that goes hand in hand with Caremark has led 
to what I shall call a “jurisprudence of red flags.” This jurisprudence 
overlooks subtle distinctions in types of information that may or may 
not come to a board and the dramatic changes that have taken place in 
the world of information technology since Caremark was decided. The 
circumstances under which a Delaware court will find bad faith in an 
oversight context are therefore highly limited. 
I argue that the promise of Caremark lies in a sharper 
understanding of the realities beneath the doctrine. The good news is 
that Delaware’s Caremark cases already contain the necessary 
elements to impose meaningful oversight duties on the board. They 
simply need to be extracted and reassembled. 
First, Delaware courts have already opened up Caremark 
jurisprudence to the evaluation of business decisions, despite their 
assertions to the contrary. To understand this, it is necessary to focus 
on the damages sought in a number of Caremark cases and the board 
behavior that allegedly proximately caused them. Second, while 
Caremark itself focused only on alleged red flags arising from internal 
monitoring,5 cases already have accepted externally-generated red 
flags as plausible support for the necessary element of scienter that 
establishes directorial bad faith. I shall demonstrate that external red 
 
 4. This fact has led two scholars to state that Caremark is declining in importance. Hillary 
A. Sale & Donald C. Langevoort, “We Believe”: Omnicare, Legal Risk Disclosure and Corporate 
Governance, 66 DUKE L.J. 763, 773 (2016) (examining interplay between federal disclosure 
regulation and oversight liability). Nonetheless, cases continue to be brought and judges continue 
to evaluate the claims seriously. To be fair, it is rare for any litigation against directors to pass the 
pleadings stage in Delaware except for litigation brought addressing conflict of interest claims, 
claims one might call traditional loyalty cases. That said, Delaware doctrine has developed in this 
context so the study of these cases remains the key to understanding Delaware law. 
 5. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 963. This was also the case in Stone ex rel. AmSouth 
Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006), in which the Delaware Supreme Court 
accepted Caremark as part of Delaware corporate law. 
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flags may be considerably more available and informative for the 
board than internal red flags, are easily and cheaply accessible, and 
therefore should be taken seriously as a separate category of 
monitoring tools. 
Guiding Caremark jurisprudence towards more meaningful 
monitoring duties also corrects for the possible judicial oversight of 
the dramatic, and relatively recent, changes in the nature of the board 
itself.6 Caremark was not only an important statement of law. It was 
also a judicial recognition of the transformation of the role of the 
board.7 Much of the history of twentieth-century corporate law is the 
story of a board in search of a purpose, a board composed largely of 
internal managers whose daily work significantly overlapped board 
function.8 Before the 1970s, there was very little literature on the 
function of the board in a public corporation and, indeed, precious 
little literature about the board itself.9 But the political and economic 
turmoil of the early part of that decade led to the start of a critical 
examination of the board’s appropriate role. This culminated in the 
creation of the modern monitoring board, as articulated by the 
American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance and as 
embraced by the Delaware courts throughout the 1980s and early 
1990s.10 By the time Caremark was decided, the monitoring board was 
a fact. Caremark arguably gave the monitoring board something to do. 
But subsequent jurisprudence has left the board again in search of a 
significant role. 
Unlocking the promise of Caremark is important. In the absence 
of a serious monitoring function, what is the board to do?11 And if 
 
 6. I don’t mean to suggest that Delaware judges are unaware of these changes. Of course they 
are. They helped to create them. What I am suggesting is that this transformation has been lost in 
doctrinal rhetoric and needs to be rediscovered. 
 7. Jennifer Arlen acknowledges this in Jennifer Arlen, The Story of Allis-Chalmers, 
Caremark, and Stone: The Directors’ Evolving Duty to Monitor in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 323, 
342 (J. Mark Ramseyer, ed., 2009). 
 8. See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 
1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1568 (2007) 
for an excellent history of the development of the monitoring board. 
 9. See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Trouble with Boards in PERSPECTIVES ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes eds., Cambridge University Press 
2010) (providing a comprehensive history of legal interest in the board and the creation of the 
modern monitoring board). 
 10. See also Gordon, supra note 8, at 1481. 
 11. See generally Mike Burkart et al., Why do Boards Exist? Governance Design in the 
Absence of Corporate Law (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 504/2017, 
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2902617. 
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there is little for the board to do, why do we have a board in the first 
place? Perhaps it would be sufficient for shareholders directly to elect 
a CEO who would be responsible for making business decisions and 
coordinating regulatory compliance, presumably with the help of 
external experts.12 Perhaps, and more plausibly, the growing world of 
regulation and its demands for corporate compliance with external 
requirements is the contemporary substitute for meaningful corporate 
governance.13 Legal recognition of these possibilities has not yet 
occurred, and for many reasons may be undesirable. 
So we are now confronted with the same question Melvin 
Eisenberg faced when he published The Structure of the 
Corporation,14 the American Law Institute began its corporate 
governance project,15 and Chancellor Allen issued Caremark: What is 
the appropriate role of the board? And, unlike the situation 
then-existing, corporate directors today are well compensated. It is 
compensation they should earn. 
The paper proceeds as follows: I will begin in Part I by following 
the money. Caremark claims are derivative. The nature of the claimed 
damages and the way the courts address them can tell us at least as 
much about the meaning of Caremark as can the repeated recitation of 
doctrine. This focus on damages requires an analysis of proximate 
cause. Cases fall into four categories. 
The first category contains what have been referred to as 
“traditional Caremark claims” and contains those cases in which the 
illegal conduct unquestionably proximately caused the corporation’s 
losses. Criminal or civil penalties and fines were imposed. 
The second category includes cases in which corporate losses 
were allegedly due to the board’s failed business decisions in the 
 
 12. Lawrence E. Mitchell, On the Direct Election of CEOs, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 261, 275–
86 (2006). 
 13. Sean Griffith has convincingly demonstrated in a recent paper that the very nature of the 
corporation as a private enterprise serving its constituents is being threatened by the web of external 
federal and state regulation and the compliance regimes they impose. Griffith, supra note 3 at 2118–
40. Whatever one may think of Delaware’s relative laxity, its legislature and courts have created a 
relatively coherent corporate law regime that functions, at least in a quotidian fashion. Professor 
Griffith suggests that, once again, Delaware is facing a loss of that franchise as a result of these 
developments. See generally Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003) 
(describing the back and forth between Delaware and the federal government in creating corporate 
law). 
 14. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 
(Beard Books 1976). 
 15. Culminating in PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1994). 
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absence of illegal conduct (or in which potential illegal conduct was 
irrelevant). Delaware doctrine claims it refuses to allow these kinds of 
circumstances to sustain Caremark claims.16 
The third category begins to demonstrate that, despite doctrine to 
the contrary, Caremark jurisprudence already evaluates losses arising 
from business risk. This category, blended cases, includes those cases 
in which legal violations occurred and were related to the claimed 
losses, but the losses arguably were proximately caused by other 
factors, including poor business decisions. The principal importance 
of illegality in these cases is to provide a doctrinal hook that permits 
courts to elide the appearance of evaluating business decisions.17 
The last category contains a single case: In re Massey Energy.18 
The losses in Massey were related to legal violations but clearly would 
have occurred even in the absence of a regulatory regime.19 Violation 
of the law was not the proximate cause of the corporation’s losses. 
Massey, I will argue, is the case that comes closest to opening up 
Caremark jurisprudence to the possibility of fulfilling its promise by 
imposing a monitoring duty on the board that covers all dimensions of 
corporate operations, business as well as legal. 
The extension of Caremark to business risk is also hampered by 
doctrinal statements that obscure the actual distinction between 
process and substance and have led courts to avoid review in perfectly 
plausible business cases. Delaware courts have created a strong barrier 
between evaluating the process by which boards make decisions and 
evaluating the substance of those decisions. The cases dealing with 
business risk seem grounded in the fear that evaluation of the 
underlying board decisions would lead them to engage in the latter, a 
fear which seems to arise from this doctrinal conflation.20 This has 
 
 16. In re Citigroup Inc., 964 A.2d 106, 126 (Del. Ch. 2009); see also In re The Goldman Sachs 
Grp., Inc., No. CIV.A. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *21 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011) (noting that 
the Delaware Supreme Court has not yet decided whether failure to monitor business risks is 
enough to sustain a Caremark claim although noting that the court in Citigroup “seemed to suggest 
the possibility of such a claim”). See generally PARTNOY supra note 3. 
 17. I am not arguing that the courts intentionally are hiding the ball. My argument, as it 
proceeds, will show that adherence to doctrine masks the reality. 
 18. In re Massey Energy Co., C.A. No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479 (Del. Ch. May 31, 
2011). 
 19. This is obviously true because, in Massey, the corporation failed to follow the regulatory 
regime. See id. at *11. 
 20. The exception is the opinion in Dow Chemical where Chancellor Chandler clearly 
articulates this distinction in a fairly straightforward case arguably involving legal risks. In re The 
Dow Chemical Co., No. 4349-CC, 2010 WL 66769, at *5 (Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 2010). 
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unnecessarily discouraged Delaware courts from applying Caremark 
(which itself is about process) to evaluate the processes by which 
business decisions are made. A focus on separating the process of 
monitoring from the substance of monitoring will make this clear. 
In Part II, I will examine the jurisprudence of red flags. The 
presence of red (or sometimes yellow) flags provides the basis for the 
directorial scienter necessary to sustain the bad faith portion of a 
Caremark claim.21 But the doctrinal articulation of the concept of red 
flags is too broad. Caremark, although it did not make this distinction, 
focused on the existence of internal red flags.22 Subsequent cases have 
also failed to make this distinction. But separating these flags into two 
categories reveals important differences that, when understood, permit 
a more subtle understanding of good faith. 
Dividing red flags into internal and external red flags (or 
internally and externally-generated information) leads to the 
conclusion that there is little justification for exculpating boards from 
the responsibility to know what is reasonably at hand.23 In the process, 
I will show that Delaware courts already have accepted the presence 
of external red flags as a predicate for liability. This should be made 
explicit and external flags treated as an independent category. 
Delaware courts might resist this distinction for fear of making 
directors responsible for knowing too much information or digging up 
obscure information. There should be no fear. Just as the board has 
transformed over the past four decades, dramatic changes in the way 
we access information have taken place since Caremark. Technology 
has made the process of gathering and sorting information a 
 
 21. As Stephen Bainbridge and his coauthors have pointed out, and the Delaware courts have 
embraced, Caremark claims are, essentially, claims that directors acted in bad faith. Stephen M. 
Bainbridge et al., Convergence of Good Faith, supra note 3. 
 22. There was no need to on the facts of the case. In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. 
Ch. 1996). 
 23. Delaware jurisprudence only credits red flags ‘waved in one’s face’ of directors or 
displayed so as to be apparent to a careful observer. Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 143 (Del. 2008). 
But see Reiter v. Fairbank, No. 11693-CB, 2016 WL 6081823 at *16 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2016) 
(holding demand not futile where board failed to act after learning about evidence of criminal 
corporate behavior); In re China Agritech, Inc., 2013 WL 2181514 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013); In re 
Massey Energy, 2011 WL 2176479 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011) (noting failure of board to act 
meaningfully in reaction to the presence of red and yellow flags in what the court saw as a corporate 
business plan predicated on the violation of mine safety laws); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. v. Greenberg, 
965 A.2d 763, 798–99 (Del. Ch. 2009) (discussing how the board tolerated “inadequate internal 
controls and knowingly fail[ed] to monitor their subordinates’ compliance with legal duties” in the 
context of a corporation operated as a “criminal organization.”). I will argue that this “face waving” 
doctrine disregards the transformation of information technology. 
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considerably easier and much cheaper task than it was when Caremark 
was decided. I will argue that the courts should incorporate these 
changes into the board’s duties. 
Part III concludes. 
I.  TYPES OF RISK 
The cases and literature on Caremark generally have focused on 
doctrinal statements about the nature and extent of Caremark duties 
and have paid little attention to the nature of the damages at issue. In 
particular, they have not examined the requisite links between the 
allegedly failed directorial monitoring and the losses that such failures 
are said to have caused. This is not surprising. Most Caremark cases 
never make it past the pleadings stage and so the question of damages 
does not come up in an actionable way. As a result, the extent to which 
Delaware courts already have expanded Caremark jurisprudence is 
obscured. A study of the cases is instructive. 
I categorize the cases in terms of the kind of risk at issue, 
following the doctrinal distinction between legal risk and business risk 
employed by the courts. The reality is more nuanced, and reveals that 
the cases align along a spectrum. Delaware courts have gone a long 
way toward incorporating business losses (in addition to legal losses) 
resulting from failed or inadequate monitoring of bad business 
decisions into their evaluations of Caremark claims. In one case, the 
Chancery Court has gone so far as to accept the failure to monitor 
business risk as a basis for such a claim.24 
A.  Legal Risk 
The first type of case addresses what is generally known as legal 
risk and has sometimes been referred to as a “traditional Caremark 
claim.”25 Legal risk is simply the possibility that employees of the 
corporation might cause it to violate positive law, resulting in 
substantial criminal or civil penalties and sometimes judgments in 
favor of private parties.26 For obvious reasons, this kind of risk is 
greatest for corporations operating in regulated industries, and the 
cases generally reflect this. Traditional Caremark cases present little 
question that the illegal conduct at issue was the proximate cause of 
 
 24. In re Massey Energy Co., 160 A.3d 484, 497 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2017).  
 25. In re Citigroup Inc., 964 A.2d 106, 123 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 26. In re The Dow Chemical Co., No. 4349-CC, 2010 WL 66769 at *5 (Del Ch. Jan. 11, 2010). 
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the corporate losses for which derivative plaintiffs seek redress. The 
fines and penalties for which plaintiffs seek corporate reimbursement 
were the direct result of illegal conduct. 
Caremark itself is too well known to merit extensive discussion. 
Briefly, Caremark is a major health care company, engaged in patient 
care and managed services as well as various therapeutic services and 
prescription drug plans. The company earned substantial revenue from 
Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement.27 It was therefore required to 
comply with a variety of regulations, including the federal Anti-
Referral Payments Law (“ARPL”).28 While attempting to comply with 
these regulations, Caremark took the position that there were 
ambiguities in determining the limits of such laws and publicly stated 
that it was uncertain of its own interpretations.29 It appears that 
Caremark chose to operate its business somewhat aggressively. 
In any event, Caremark found itself under investigation by the 
Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of 
Justice, resulting in a federal grand jury indictment, the discovery of 
violations, substantial fines and civil damages, and a comprehensive 
settlement that included Caremark’s obligation to improve its 
monitoring practices.30 Derivative litigation followed the indictment 
and resolved in the settlement at issue in the case.31 
The Chancellor’s obligation to approve the settlement included a 
central determination of whether that settlement was “fair and 
reasonable,” a determination that necessarily required that he evaluate 
the strengths and weaknesses of the derivative claims.32 The central 
legal question was whether the directors had breached “their duty of 
attention or care,” “possibly the most difficult theory in corporate law 
upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment,”33 difficult 
because, as the Chancellor had written in Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l 
Inc.,34 any other liability standard would distort the risk/reward 
 
 27. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 961. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 962. 
 30. Id. at 962–66. 
 31. Id. at 966. 
 32. Id. at 966–72. 
 33. Id. at 967. 
 34. 683 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1996). I will address this particular bit of Delaware mythology 
later in this paper. 
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calculus of corporate directors leading to a dearth of qualified 
candidates willing to serve.35 
Important for this paper and subsequent jurisprudence is the 
Chancellor’s careful distinction between judicial evaluation of the 
wisdom of the board’s decision—which can never be questioned 
absent a fiduciary breach—and the nature of the process used to arrive 
at the decision, which can always be open to judicial evaluation. Thus, 
he looked at the processes by which the board established internal 
monitoring procedures to determine whether it had adequately 
performed its oversight role.36 Despite its failure to detect the illegal 
activity at issue, he concluded that it had.37 
Important, too, is the court’s focus on the fact that the risks at 
issue were legal risks, a focus that “has been given special importance 
by an increasing tendency, especially under federal law, to employ the 
criminal law to assure corporate compliance with external legal 
requirements . . . .”38 External legal requirements had also been at 
issue in the 1963 case of Graham v. Allis-Chalmers,39 a case that held 
the board only to the standard of actual notice of illegal activity for 
liability to be imposed. The court here rejected that standard in favor 
of one that required the board to assure itself of the existence within 
the corporation of reasonable information and reporting systems, and 
thus gave birth to oversight liability.40 
Despite this focus on legal compliance, the Chancellor left open 
the possibility that such information and reporting systems might be 
required to provide monitoring of other risks, noting that information 
and reporting systems sufficient to satisfy the board’s duty must 
represent “a good faith attempt to provide senior management and the 
Board with information respecting material acts, events, or conditions 
within the corporation, including compliance with applicable statutes 
 
 35. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (citing Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l Inc., 683 A.2d 1049 
(Del. Ch. 1996)). The observation of directors’ risk/reward calculus, often articulated as a fear that 
too high a standard of liability would discourage qualified directors from serving, is something of 
a mantra in Delaware jurisprudence. Yet I have never seen a Delaware court cite any evidence 
whatsoever to support its own resolutions of this calculus. 
 36. Id. at 963. 
 37. Id. at 972. 
 38. Id. at 969. 
 39. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). 
 40. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. 
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and regulations.”41 Yet no subsequent Delaware case in which the 
risks at issue were described as other than legal risks has survived a 
motion to dismiss. 
This is probably because no such case has presented sufficient 
evidence of board failure, of the presence of adequate red and yellow 
flags to alert the board to the possible failure of its information 
systems. But I suspect there is more. As I will discuss below, the court 
in the important Citigroup case, despite its care, elided (as a matter of 
fact, not of doctrine) the distinction between reviewing process and 
reviewing substance that the Chancellor was at pains to make in 
Caremark.42 This has led, despite some ambiguous language, to an 
unnecessary inference that Caremark duties are centered on legal risks 
alone.43 
The Delaware Supreme Court’s canonization of Caremark in 
Stone v. Ritter was a case involving legal risks similar to the type of 
risks posed in Caremark itself, that is to say external legal risk.44 
Similarly, the damages at issue—fines and regulatory penalties—were 
proximately caused by employee misconduct.45 Custodial account 
holders at AmSouth Bancorporation managed a Ponzi scheme in the 
face of corporate failure to comply with the federal Bank Secrecy Act 
and anti-money laundering regulations because employees did not file 
required suspicious activity reports.46 The result was indictment of the 
bank followed by a deferred prosecution agreement under which it 
paid significant fines and additional civil penalties as a result of 
regulatory prosecution.47 Derivative litigation followed. 
The Supreme Court accepted the Chancery Court’s 
characterization of the matter as a “‘classic Caremark claim . . . [,] a 
claim of directorial liability for corporate loss . . . predicated upon 
 
 41. Id. at 969 (emphasis added); see also Bainbridge et al., Convergence of Good Faith, supra 
note 3 (noting Allen’s statement that monitoring was to cover not only legal risk but business 
performance). 
 42. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 972. 
 43. I discuss Citigroup in the following section. In Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 
(Del. Ch. 2003), then-Vice Chancellor Strine noted that Caremark “is rightly seen as a prod towards 
the greater exercise of care by directors in monitoring their corporations’ compliance with legal 
standards . . . .” 
 44. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). Indeed the 
ur-case on the duty to monitor, Graham, 182 A.2d at 127, also dealt with external regulation—in 
that case, the anti-trust laws. 
 45. Stone, 911 A.2d at 365. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 365–66. 
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ignorance of liability creating activities within the corporation . . . .”48 
“Liability creating activities” are, of course, violations of law. 
Accepting the conclusions of an independent report of the bank’s 
internal compliance monitoring systems, or at least concluding that the 
board could reasonably have accepted its conclusions that such 
systems were adequate, the court held that the complaint was properly 
dismissed for plaintiff’s failure to make demand.49 It was important to 
the decision that the members of the board were untainted by interest, 
dependence, or the substantial likelihood of liability.50 The court had 
little more to say on the matter, essentially embracing the language 
and reasoning of Caremark itself.51 
B.  Business Risk 
The next category of risk is business risk. Business risk cases 
present situations where the plaintiff seeks to redress losses 
proximately caused by business decisions that turned out badly. The 
argument is that these losses would not have occurred but for the 
board’s failure to monitor the corporation’s business. 
If legal risk characterizes traditional Caremark claims, claims 
based on business risk doctrinally appear to remain beyond the Pale. 
These, it is said, are claims that Delaware jurisprudence will never 
 
 48. Id. at 364. 
 49. Id. at 369. 
 50. Id. at 367. 
 51. It had quite a lot to say on the issue of good faith. See infra note 167–171 and 
accompanying text. Similar cases involving straightforward legal risks include: Horman v. Abney, 
C.A. No.12290-VCS, 2017 WL 242571 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2017) (dismissing a straightforward 
Caremark claim based on penalties and fines for regulatory violations because of inadequate 
particularized pleadings); Reiter v. Fairbank, No. 11693-CB, 2016 WL 6081823 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 
2016) (straightforward legally-based Caremark claim alleging board’s failure to detect violations 
of the Bank Secrecy Act, while reciting the Delaware mantra that Caremark duties are grounded in 
legal risk and not business risk); Melbourne Mun. Firefighters’ Pension Tr. Fund on Behalf of 
Qualcomm, Inc. v. Jacobs, No. 10872-VCMR, 2016 WL 4076369 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 2016), aff’d, 
158 A.3d 449 (Del. 2017) (demand not excused as to Caremark claim for allowing antitrust 
violations when no particularized facts demonstrated that directors failure to act in the face of three 
red flags constituted bad faith); Ironworkers Dist. Council of Philadelphia & Vicinity Ret. & 
Pension Plan v. Andreotti, C.A. No. 9714–VCG, 2015 WL 2270673 (Del. Ch. May 8, 2015) 
(finding a violation of intellectual property laws and breach of licensing agreement). There are facts 
in the opinion that might suggest this case could be seen as a blended case, but it is unclear if it 
would be more appropriate to treat it as a legal case. Stone, 911 A.2d at 367; La. Mun. Police Emps.’ 
Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313 (Del. Ch. 2012) (denying motion to dismiss straightforward 
Caremark claim based on criminal and regulatory violations and resulting penalties and fines); see 
also In re Duke Energy Corp., No. 7705-VCG, 2016 WL 4543788 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2016) 
(upholding a straightforward bad faith claim against a Rule 23.1 motion to dismiss because of the 
well-pled allegations that the board had knowingly caused the corporation to violate positive law). 
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permit because it is for the boards, not the courts, to make business 
decisions, and monitoring business risk appears to be treated as a 
business decision. Courts may only review process. Thus, courts in the 
few straightforward business risk cases refuse to review these 
decisions as breaching Delaware’s divide between substance and 
process review.52 
As I have already noted, Caremark expressly left open the 
possibility that board failure to monitor business risk could lead to 
oversight liability.53 A duty to monitor business risk makes sense. 
Directors are chosen for their business expertise, not their legal 
expertise. And while criminal and regulatory penalties can often be 
substantial, they rarely are so great as to destroy or even severely 
cripple a corporation. Bad business decisions do have that potential. 
Among the few tasks for which the monitoring board unquestionably 
is responsible is monitoring the CEO. What does that monitoring 
entail? His business success. At least to this extent, the board is already 
responsible for monitoring business risk. To limit enforceable 
monitoring, then, to legal risk thus implies a very different, and 
somewhat peculiar, notion of the corporation.54 The question is 
whether the duty to monitor goes beneath the CEO’s business 
performance. 
The 2009 Citigroup case was one of several derivative actions 
brought by shareholders following the 2008 financial crisis.55 
Plaintiffs sought to impose liability on the corporation’s directors for 
failing adequately to monitor and manage its exposure in the subprime 
mortgage market (and for failing to assure thorough and accurate 
financial reporting).56 Plaintiffs pled demand futility, alleging the 
board’s substantial risk of liability because of its disregard of 
 
 52. There is little point in attempting to review these cases from a proximate cause perspective 
because they are dismissed on the very nature of the claims as evaluating inappropriate risk. 
Citigroup implicitly rejected any notion of the failure to monitor as proximate cause by holding 
that the alleged red flags were irrelevant to the company. Goldman, as I will soon discuss, has a 
more plausible connection. Nonetheless, the cases are important for the analysis of the blended 
cases I discuss below. 
 53. In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 54. Professor Griffith already sees potentially dangerous changes in corporate purpose arising 
from rapidly evolving and pervasive regulatory regimes. Griffith, supra note 3. 
 55. In re Citigroup Inc., 964 A.2d 106, 113 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 56. Id. at 114. 
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significant red flags that ought to have put it on notice that it should 
pay greater attention to this risk.57 
In holding that demand was not excused, and thus dismissing the 
case, the court distinguished Caremark, noting that a traditional 
Caremark claim involved the failure of a board to monitor violations 
of the law, whereas the complaint here was based upon the 
“defendants’ alleged failure to properly monitor Citigroup’s business 
risk . . . .”58 Although the court noted that it might be possible for a 
plaintiff to sustain the burden of proving a Caremark claim regarding 
business risk under some set of facts,59 this seems implausible in light 
of the court’s central reasoning, which I quote at length: 
Although these claims are framed by plaintiffs as Caremark 
claims, plaintiffs’ theory essentially amounts to a claim that 
the director defendants should be personally liable to the 
Company because they failed to fully recognize the risk 
posed by subprime securities. When one looks past the lofty 
allegations of duties of oversight and red flags used to dress 
up these claims, what is left appears to be plaintiff 
shareholders attempting to hold the director defendants 
personally liable for making (or allowing to be made) 
business decisions that, in hindsight, turned out poorly for 
the Company. Delaware Courts have faced these types of 
claims many times and have developed doctrines to deal 
with them—the fiduciary duty of care and the business 
judgment rule. These doctrines properly focus on the 
decision-making process rather than on a substantive 
evaluation of the merits of the decision. This follows from 
the inadequacy of the Court, due in part to a concept known 
as hindsight bias, to properly evaluate whether corporate 
decision-makers made a “right” or “wrong” decision.60  
 Were there any question that the Chancellor understood 
Caremark to be limited to legal claims, such doubt was erased two 
pages later. 
To the extent the Court allows shareholder plaintiffs to 
succeed on a theory that a director is liable for a failure to 
 
 57. I discuss the issue of red flags separately in Part II. 
 58. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 123. 
 59. Id. at 126. 
 60. Id. at 124. 
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monitor business risk, the Court risks undermining the well 
settled policy of Delaware law by inviting Courts to perform 
a hindsight evaluation of the reasonableness or prudence of 
directors’ business decisions. . . . To impose liability on 
directors for making a ‘wrong’ business decision would 
cripple their ability to earn returns for investors by taking 
business risks. “Indeed, this kind of judicial second guessing 
is what the business judgment rule was designed to prevent, 
and even if a complaint is framed under a Caremark theory, 
this Court will not abandon such bedrock principles of 
Delaware fiduciary duty law.”61  
With such powerful statements of director-protective Delaware 
judicial policy, it is hard to imagine a case of business risk 
monitoring that could sustain a plaintiff’s complaint.62 
I suppose it is possible to read this language as the court’s 
interpretation of the complaint as alleging a failed business decision 
rather than a failure to monitor. But that possibility is undercut by at 
least two observations. First, the court opened its opinion by 
describing the claim as a failure to monitor, thus at least implicitly 
recognizing the distinction that it later elided between judicial review 
of the monitoring procedures and processes and the substantive 
business decision to enter the subprime market.63 
Second, the red flags asserted by plaintiffs also pointed to a duty 
to monitor rather than to the substance of the decision. The red flags 
that were pled did not specifically point to Citigroup’s investment 
behavior but to the risks of the subprime market more generally. These 
risks—these red flags—had nothing to do with Citigroup itself, as the 
court hastens to point out.64 That is all the more reason to read the 
 
 61. Id. at 126. 
 62. See In re The Dow Chemical Co., No. 4349-CC, 2010 WL 66769 (Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 2010) 
(refusing to evaluate the board’s decision to agree to an unconditional merger as a “business 
decision,” despite its failure to note possible bribery that could have affected the results of the deal). 
 63. The opinion acknowledges this in its second sentence. “Plaintiffs brought this action . . . 
alleging, in essence, that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties by failing to properly 
monitor and manage the risks the Company faced in the subprime lending market . . . .” In re 
Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 111. 
 64. Id. at 114–15. “As will be more fully explained below, the ‘red flags’ alleged in the eighty-
six page Complaint are generally statements from public documents that reflect worsening 
conditions in the financial markets, including the subprime and credit markets, and the effects of 
those worsening conditions had on market participants, including Citigroup’s peers.” Id. at 114–
15; see also id. at 128 (repeating this analysis). I will discuss in Part II why these red flags should 
have been sufficient. 
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complaint as alleging a monitoring failure rather than a decisional 
failure. If plaintiffs had indeed been alleging the latter, the evidence 
would have to have been directed at internal Citigroup decision-
making. It was not. 
It is, perhaps, understandable that the court conflated the two 
types of decisions. Delaware courts are famously averse to the 
possibility of appearing to evaluate the substance of corporate 
business decisions, frequently asserting their lack of business 
expertise and the undesirability of hindsight evaluations of risky 
decisions that may have been rational at the time they were made but 
turned out rather badly.65 
But Delaware courts do evaluate corporate business decisions, at 
least in non-loyalty cases, on the basis of process. That is, in fact, the 
very posture of the business judgment rule that by definition arises in 
cases that challenge business decisions. Although it may be argued 
that the business judgment rule covers business decisions made at the 
board level and Caremark monitoring looks at decisions made deeper 
in the enterprise, there is little reason to distinguish the board’s process 
of establishing monitoring mechanisms for (arguably more 
consequential) business risks from its process of establishing 
monitoring mechanisms to ensure legal compliance. 
Evaluating the decision-making process of a board of directors is 
precisely what Delaware courts do all the time. The lifeblood of the 
Delaware courts from a corporate law perspective is a stream of 
derivative cases alleging that decisions made by a corporation’s board 
should lead to the board’s liability. Although the enactment of section 
102(b)(7) permitting exculpatory charter provisions largely has 
eradicated direct care claims,66 this kind of review survives in 
everything from derivative demand analysis to cases reviewing 
executive compensation,67 to takeover cases, to Caremark itself. In 
those cases, courts regularly reiterate that what they are doing is 
reviewing the process by which a board made a decision, not the 
decision itself.68 
 
 65. I hasten to point out that Delaware courts protest too much, employing their own business 
judgment in cases where demand is alleged to be futile. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 
(Del. 1981). 
 66. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2018). 
 67. In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 68. See id. at 52. 
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Would the result have been different had the court evaluated the 
Citigroup case on this basis rather than dismissing it as the kind of 
business decision courts will not review? Citigroup was relatively 
easy, because there is no evidence in the opinion that the board had 
made an affirmative decision to enter the subprime market, nor does it 
appear that plaintiffs made such an allegation. The result would likely 
have been the same. But the contours of the board’s monitoring 
responsibilities would have been broader. 
Goldman Sachs69 is different. The board there did make an 
affirmative decision by approving the employee compensation plan 
that was at issue in the case.70 The court refused to review the board’s 
failure to monitor the compensation regime, identifying the issue as 
inviting the kind of business decision review declined in Citigroup.71 
But it would have been perfectly consistent with Delaware 
jurisprudence for the court to have asked whether the compensation 
scheme was of a nature to require monitoring mechanisms and to 
evaluate any process the board might have used to consider this 
question. I discuss Goldman further in the subsection immediately 
following. 
C.  Blended Risk 
Cases have been brought that go beyond traditional Caremark 
claims and deal with the board’s failure to monitor other kinds of risks. 
While, unsurprisingly, the typical result is dismissal, some of these 
cases fully evaluate the Caremark claim at the pleading stage without 
analyzing the nature of the alleged wrong or the types of damages 
sought. In fact, as Vice Chancellor Laster wrote in Pyott, a case 
decided after Citigroup, “[t]he list of corporate traumas for which 
stockholders theoretically could seek to hold directors accountable is 
long and ever expanding: regulatory sanctions, criminal or civil fines, 
environmental disasters, accounting restatements, misconduct by 
officers or employees, massive business losses, and innumerable other 
potential calamities.”72 Although the Vice Chancellor used the word 
“theoretically,” he did so citing Caremark itself, with no reference to 
 
 69. In re The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. CIV.A. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 12, 2011). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at *22. 
 72. La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 340 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
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Citigroup.73 Oversight liability for failed business decisions appears 
to remain plausible. A close examination of the cases demonstrates 
that courts have already, at least implicitly, allowed these claims to be 
made.74 
I refer to these cases as blended cases because, in each of them, 
some sort of legal violation was present, but losses caused by the legal 
violations, if any, were only part of the damages for which plaintiffs 
sought recompense. Damages were also sought, sometimes generally 
and sometimes more specifically, for losses caused by bad business 
oversight. Thus, while the cases do not explicitly embrace oversight 
monitoring of business risk, they do illustrate the difficulty of isolating 
the proximate cause of damages, or at least all of the damages, in 
oversight liability cases. 
Rich v. Chong75 is a case suggesting that Caremark jurisprudence 
goes beyond the traditional fact pattern and would appear to impose a 
duty to monitor internal financial controls as well, a monitoring 
function that clearly implicates business risk as well as legal risk. The 
damages claimed in Rich proximately resulted from corporate 
mismanagement, although regulatory action had begun. 
Rich was a derivative suit brought by the shareholder of a 
Delaware holding company, the sole asset of which was Fuqi, a 
Chinese jewelry company.76 Less than a year after its initial public 
offering, the company announced a restatement of its financials. 
Additional negative disclosures followed the plaintiff’s prompt 
demand on the board, as a result of all of which the price of the stock 
dropped from its IPO level of $21.50 a share in July 2009 to $1 at the 
time the case was heard in 2013.77 The board failed to respond to 
 
 73. Id. at 340 (“[O]rdinary business decisions that are made by officers and employees deeper 
in the interior of the organization can . . . vitally affect the welfare of the corporation and its ability 
to achieve its various strategic and financial goals.”) (citing In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959 
(Del. Ch. 1996). 
 74. It is possible to over-read some of these cases because few have made it past the pleadings 
stage and none of them have resulted in an opinion evaluating liability on the merits of the case. In 
blended cases, however, the courts have not relied upon (and rarely have discussed) the nature of 
the damages as a reason to dismiss the claims the way the court did in Citigroup. That the cases are 
blended, that is, including law violations as well as failed business decisions, may be the reason for 
this, but it nonetheless stands that significant business losses resulting from risky decisions 
characterize these cases. 
 75. Rich ex rel Fuqi Int’l v. Chong, 66 A.3d 963 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 76. Id. at 966. 
 77. Id. The drop in share price is, of course, not a proper form of damages to be sought under 
a derivative claim. 
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plaintiff’s demand for two years, although it did appoint a special 
internal investigation committee whose activities were halted when 
the corporation failed to pay its outside auditor, counsel, and forensic 
specialists, and its members resigned (as did four of its seven directors 
and three of its officers).78 
The court had little trouble permitting the plaintiff to pursue his 
Caremark claim, despite the fact that the board had not yet responded 
to his demand nor had the special committee completed its 
investigation.79 The board’s abandonment of its investigation, 
especially in the face of apparent financial wrongdoing (and when the 
corporation publicly admitted that its internal controls were 
inadequate) was an abdication of board responsibility sufficient to 
remove the protection of the business judgment rule because of an 
apparent failure of the board to act in good faith.80 
The court also refused to dismiss the complaint for failure to state 
a claim under Caremark, reciting the now-familiar Stone v. Ritter 
mantra that “[t]he essence of a Caremark claim is a breach of the duty 
of loyalty arising from a directors’ bad-faith failure to exercise 
oversight control over the company.”81 Applying the plaintiff-friendly 
standards of Rule 12(b)(6) (having gotten over the more difficult 
hurdle of Rule 23.1 because of the board’s abdication of its 
investigation), the court enumerated the corporation’s own various 
admissions of the inadequacy of its internal financial monitoring 
systems, leading the court to conclude that Fuqi had “no meaningful 
controls in place.”82 The court also found sufficient red flags to permit 
the inference that the directors knew that Fuqi’s internal controls were 
inadequate, thus satisfying the scienter requirement necessary to 
establish the lack of good faith that sustains a Caremark claim.83 
The damages claimed are telling. The case was pled as one 
involving the board’s failure to establish a meaningful system of 
internal controls, leading to misstatements in SEC filings and an SEC 
investigation.84 The company had sustained no damages from legal 
 
 78. Id. at 972. 
 79. Id. at 973. 
 80. Id. at 978. 
 81. Id. at 980. 
 82. Id. at 983. 
 83. Id. at 984. 
 84. Verified Derivative Complaint at 2, Rich ex rel Fuqi Int’l v. Chong, 66 A.3d 963 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 25, 2013) (No 7616-VCG), 2012 WL 2357870. 
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fines and penalties at the time of filing, and the complaint reflects this 
by asking for damages “including, but not limited to, costs and 
expenses incurred in connection with the accounting restatement 
process, the SEC’s investigation and the Company’s NASDAQ 
delisting proceedings.”85 More broadly, and apparently contemplating 
additional unspecified damages, it demands that the company be 
awarded “the amount of damages sustained by the Company as a result 
of the Individual Defendants’ breaches of fiduciary duty.”86 Among 
those damages that later were alleged were the Company’s payment 
of $120 million to an unidentified Chinese party that appears simply 
to have disappeared.87 This payment does not, on its face, appear to be 
a result of legal or regulatory violations, and thus can be seen as 
constituting a loss resulting from a business risk that does not fit the 
pattern of a traditional Caremark claim. The claim is that the board 
failed to monitor the corporation’s internal financial practices leading 
to its failure to uncover the financial mismanagement. Thus, Rich 
appears to accept an expanded board oversight role.88 
Several other cases are similar. Desimone v. Barrows89 dealt with 
corporate harm due to option backdating, and Goldman Sachs90 
addressed management compensation practices, although neither case 
survived a motion to dismiss.91 In contrast, AIG92 survived the 
pleadings stage. 
The wrongdoing in Desimone was brought to light by an SEC 
investigation, leading Sycamore Networks, Inc. to have to restate its 
 
 85. Id. at ¶ 73. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Plaintiff’s Answering Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 6, Rich ex 
rel. Fuqi Int’l, Inc. v. Chong, 66 A.3d 963 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2013) (No. 7616-VCG), 2012 WL 
4293959. 
 88. Saito v. McCall, No. CIV.A. 17132-NC, 2004 WL 3029876 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 
2004), overruled by Lambrecht v. O’Neal, 3 A.3d 277 (Del. 2010). In Saito, the Caremark claim 
survived a motion to dismiss, and thus might fall into the same category, but it is unclear from the 
opinion and an earlier opinion in the case, Ash v. McCall, No. Civ. A. 17132, 2000 WL 1370341 
(Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000), what the nature of the damages sought were. Although the action was 
derivative, the only corporate harm discussed was a drop in share price. See also Canadian 
Commercial Workers Indus. Pension Plan v. Alden, 2006 WL 456786 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 2006) 
(dismissing Caremark claims alleging failure to monitor internal fiduciary self-dealing transactions 
on other grounds). 
 89. 924 A.2d 908 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 90. In re The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. CIV.A. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *1–2 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011). 
 91. In Desimone, part of the complaint survived a Rule 23.1 motion to dismiss but not a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 947, 950. 
 92. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. v. Greenberg, 965 A.2d 763 (Del Ch. 2009). 
51.1 MITCHELL_V.9 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2019  5:16 PM 
260 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:239 
earnings. Plaintiff also had discovered the existence of an internal 
memo suggesting that options granted to six “rank and file employees” 
were backdated to the lowest trading price in the quarter preceding the 
grants, which memo led the corporation’s Audit Committee to launch 
an internal investigation.93 Plaintiff also alleged backdated grants to 
Sycamore’s officers and outside directors.94 
The court disposed of the Caremark aspect of the complaint by 
observing that the complaint failed to allege any facts suggesting the 
inadequacy of Sycamore’s internal controls, and the absence of any 
red flags that would have created the requisite scienter to sustain a 
finding that the directors had “abdicated their oversight 
responsibilities by failing to take remedial action.”95 The court 
apparently found no need to discuss the nature of the harm to the 
corporation itself or, relatedly, the type of monitoring in which the 
board was to engage. It does appear, however, that the principal 
complaint as to the relief sought for the corporation through the 
derivative action could not have been a drop in stock price caused by 
the restated financials because that was harm caused to the 
stockholders and thus the subject of a direct action rather than a 
derivative action. 
The complaint makes this clear. Among the damages alleged to 
be suffered by the company were underpayment by the employees to 
the corporation upon exercise of their backdated options.96 When 
options are granted below market price, “then the employee pays less 
and the company gets less money for the stock when the option is 
exercised.”97 And while exposure to regulatory penalties was also 
alleged, plaintiffs sought payment of “substantial monetary damages 
as a result of the [defendants’ breaches of fiduciary duty] . . . as well 
as further and even greater damage in the future, including damage to 
the Company’s reputation, business, and good will.”98 
The same is largely true for Goldman Sachs, in which a claim for 
demand futility also failed. While the court treated Goldman as a 
 
 93. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 922–23. 
 94. Id. at 914. 
 95. Id. at 940. 
 96. Id. at 913. 
 97. Amended Derivative Action Complaint, Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908 (Del. Ch. 
June 7, 2007) (No.2210-VCS), 2006 WL 4780283, at 2.  
 98. Id. at 22, 30. Also alleged was a generalized complaint that “the Company has sustained 
and will continue to sustain significant damages in the millions of dollars.” Id. at 34. 
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business risk case, I analyze it here because the complaint’s assertion 
of unethical (although not illegal) conduct by Goldman employees 
was an obvious attempt to bring the case within traditional Caremark 
doctrine and the losses claimed were clearly proximately caused by 
business decisions. 
The central complaint in Goldman was that the compensation 
structure established by the board created a divergence between the 
interests of management and the interests of outside stockholders, 
creating incentives for management to increase net revenue without 
regard to the risks.99 Having created this system, the complaint 
alleged, the board breached its Caremark duties by failing to monitor 
management appropriately in light of the compensation scheme it had 
approved.100 The losses proximately caused by the alleged board 
oversight failures were business losses, not fines and penalties.101 
The case is notable, for my purposes, for two points made by the 
court, and one that is implicit in the decision. First, the court noted that 
the risky conduct engaged in by management might have been 
unethical but it was not illegal as contemplated by Caremark. 
Management was permitted to pursue such legal conduct, despite the 
risk of ethical violations, so reports about risk did not raise red flags 
for monitoring from the perspective of the board.102 
Second, the court recognized the board’s decisions as business 
monitoring decisions in contrast to legal monitoring decisions. Stating 
that Citigroup had left open the question of whether the board had a 
duty to monitor business risk, the court stated that if a duty to monitor 
business risk existed, the court would not be permitted to look at the 
substance of the decision at all.103 This is an important observation, 
and the only statement I have found in Caremark business risk cases 
clearly to acknowledge the difference between procedure and 
substance in evaluating the kinds of corporate behavior the board is 
obliged to monitor. Goldman thus leaves open a path to the court’s 
 
 99. In re The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. CIV.A. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *3 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011). 
 100. Second Amended Shareholder Derivative Complaint at *79, In re The Goldman Sachs 
Grp., Inc., 2011 WL 4826104 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011) (No. 5215-CC), 2010 WL 5069059. 
 101. Indeed, among the damages alleged was repayment by the defendants of over-payments 
of compensation to employees. Id. at *79. 
 102. In re The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. CIV.A. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *20 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011). 
 103. Id. at *22. 
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eventual recognition that its evaluation of a board’s monitoring of non-
legal risks does not necessarily (or even logically) entail an 
examination of the business risks themselves. 
Indeed, it would have been an important correction to a 
significant dimension of corporate behavior Caremark did not 
address, a correction that could then have made Caremark evaluation 
more meaningful and complete. The issue is one of incentives. Legal 
and regulatory regimes, by threatening corporations with penalties for 
violation, create exogenous incentives for corporations to obey the 
law. Compensation regimes create endogenous incentives for 
employees to work to increase corporate profit. While compensation 
arguably leading to corporate damages was squarely at issue in 
Goldman, it is probable that the structure of Caremark’s compensation 
system (and that of AmSouth Bancorporation and so many other 
corporations) rewarded individual employee success in increasing 
profits.104 It doesn’t take much to understand that these compensation 
incentives can undercut exogenous legal incentives, especially when 
considered from the perspective of an individual employee in a large 
organization rather then the perspective of the organization itself. 
While the conduct in Goldman was alleged to be unethical rather than 
illegal, a discussion of the role of compensation schemes in the 
monitoring context would have been helpful and important. But the 
court foreclosed the possibility of this analysis by labeling the decision 
an un-analyzable business decision.105 This missed opportunity for a 
richer analysis of the realities of corporate governance has further 
stunted Caremark’s ability to grow. 
Goldman illustrates the proposition that even the responsible 
monitoring of legal risks is unlikely to ensure actual corporate legal 
compliance in the face of compensation schemes that create different 
incentives. It is almost certainly the case that a Delaware court would 
be uncomfortable evaluating the incentives created by compensation 
 
 104. See also Reiter v. Fairbank, No. 11693-CB, 2016 WL 6081823 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2016) 
(incentives to bring in volume from the legally risky check-cashing business); Stone ex rel. 
AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006) (incentives to accommodate 
profitable customers); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. v. Greenberg, 965 A.2d 763 (Del Ch. 2009) (promise of 
significant stock compensation if target share price is maintained); In re Dow Chemical Co., 2010 
WL 66769 (Del Ch. 2010) (noting distinction between monitoring business risk and monitoring 
fraudulent and criminal conduct). 
 105. Critical in the case as well was the absence of red flags. In re Goldman Sachs Grp., 2011 
WL 4826104, at *20. 
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schemes, asserting once again its incompetence to evaluate business 
decisions. Goldman implies the way, by presenting the possibility of 
reviewing the processes by which boards monitor potentially legally 
risky compensation schemes in light of employees’ economic 
incentives. 
AIG is an easy case from a Caremark perspective. The complaint 
survived motions to dismiss in a situation where blatant illegality was 
obvious and the focus of the opinion was only on the inside directors 
who allegedly took part in the company’s various schemes.106 While 
the defendants certainly broke laws and paid enormous fines and 
expenses consistent with traditional Caremark claims, the proximate 
cause of a significant amount of the corporation’s losses were business 
losses arising from business decisions (or non-decisions) that created 
extraordinary risk for the company.107 Indeed, the complaint pleads 
that defendants’ actions caused damage to the company’s reputation 
and good will, increased its cost of capital, and led to “a loss of 
business and business opportunities.”108 There certainly were 
violations of law. But the complaint further alleges that defendants’ 
breaches of fiduciary duties included, among other things, “failing to 
ensure that AIG not engage in any unsafe, unsound, or illegal business 
practices . . . .”109 
AIG110 involved a variety of alleged manipulations of the 
company’s financial statements, tax avoidance schemes, conspiracies 
with others to rig markets, and the sale of expert fraud assistance to 
other companies, leading to $1.6 billion in fines (with regulatory 
processes still proceeding at the time of the opinion) and a loss of $3.5 
billion in the company’s equity. The scope, extent, and clear intent of 
the manipulations were so extraordinary as to lead then-Vice 
Chancellor Strine to pointedly describe AIG as a “criminal 
organization.”111 
 
 106. The case was also easy because it involved a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 
a much easier standard for plaintiffs to plead than the more restrictive Rule 23.1. The Vice 
Chancellor ruled that demand futility under Rule 23.1 had been satisfied by the special litigation 
committee’s express neutrality with respect to plaintiffs’ demand. Am. Int’l Grp., 965 A.2d at 807. 
 107. Id. at 791. 
 108. First Amended Combined Complaint at 190, 193, Am. Int’l Grp., Inc.  v. Greenberg, 965 
A.2d 763 (Del. Ch. 2009) (No. 769-VCS), 2008 WL 4618463. 
 109. Id. at 192. 
 110. Am. Int’l Grp., 965 A.2d at 763. 
 111. Id. at 796. 
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The court’s evaluation of plaintiff’s Caremark claim is anti-
climactic. The complaint did not assert the absence, inadequacy, or 
ignorance of internal controls “in one discrete instance of serious 
wrongdoing.”112 There was no need for red flags. Rather, “[t]he 
diversity, pervasiveness, and materiality of the alleged financial 
wrongdoing at AIG is extraordinary,”113 leading to the almost 
unavoidable inference that the defendants, who both knew of and 
participated in the fraud, clearly knew that AIG’s internal controls and 
monitoring system were inadequate. This was enough to sustain the 
claim. 
And then there is Massey. 
D.  In re Massey Energy Company Derivative and  
Class Action Litigation114 
Massey stands alone. It does so not because of the blatantly bad 
misconduct at issue. After all, AIG and Rich also dealt with bad 
behavior, although not leading (as far as I know) to death. Massey’s 
importance is not in these facts. 
Massey stands alone because of the kind of risks the company 
took and the losses that they proximately caused. In this respect, 
Massey is different from other Caremark cases. 
In traditional Caremark cases, the losses claimed are the fines and 
penalties imposed upon the corporation because of its violations of 
law. In the blended cases, losses included fines and penalties but 
additional losses were caused by bad business decisions. In Rich, for 
example, the $120 million that allegedly disappeared in China likely 
was a fraudulent payment, but it could also have been the result of a 
risky business decision.115 In Desimone, the option backdating claim, 
which survived a motion to dismiss because directors were interested, 
arguably violated fiduciary duties, but loss was as a result of 
insufficient payment to the corporation for the stock.116 The direct 
losses at AIG were largely caused by fraudulent transactions that 
resulted in substantial fines and penalties, but the allegedly significant 
 
 112. Id. at 799. 
 113. Id. 
 114. In re Massey Energy Co., C.A. No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479 (Del. Ch. May 31, 
2011); see also In re Massey Energy Co., 160 A.3d 484 (Del. Ch. 2017) (dismissing Caremark 
complaint because plaintiffs lost derivative standing following the merger of Massey into Alpha). 
 115. Rich ex rel Fuqi Int’l v. Chong, 66 A.3d 963 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 116. Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
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reputational losses and increased cost of credit were losses arising 
from business risks.117 AIG could well have suffered much of the loss 
at issue by legal yet aggressive business decisions. In this case they 
crossed the line into fraud. 
The distinction between business losses occasioned by illegal 
behavior and business risk is blurry. The blended cases are transitional 
(conceptually, if not chronologically). One could perhaps argue that, 
at least in cases like AIG and, to a lesser extent perhaps, Goldman, 
business risk was at issue because of decisions to pursue especially 
aggressive corporate policies.118 But the cases were not presented that 
way. 
Massey involved straightforward business risk. Of course, there 
were multiple violations of laws and regulations, compliance with 
which might have prevented the mine disaster that gave rise to the 
litigation. But the losses in Massey were proximately caused by 
violations of mine safety practices, not by the violation of mine safety 
regulations.119 It wasn’t legal fines that were at issue but mass tort 
liability, lost profits, and severely damaged reputation, all stemming 
from an alleged business policy of placing profits above safety.120 The 
violation of mine safety regulations, while paralleling this behavior, 
were incidental to the harm. 
Massey found itself confronted with extensive liability and 
serious reputational harm following an explosion at one of its mines 
that killed 29 miners.121 What made this accident more compelling 
than a typical business failure is the position taken by Blankenship, 
the company’s CEO, Inman, his friend and enabler, and a complacent 
outside board—that Blankenship and the company knew far more 
about mine safety than federal regulators. This attitude led them 
consistently to violate federal mine safety laws. It was the company’s 
 
 117. Am. Int’l Grp., 965 A.2d at 763. 
 118. Perhaps the statement in the text sounds silly given the pervasive fraud at AIG. But one 
does wonder whether aggression short of illegality might have produced a different result in light 
of the fact that, as was not alleged in Citigroup, directors were intimately involved in the aggressive 
conduct. Certainly the increased cost of credit would have been a possibility. Damaged reputation 
might have been as well because, as an insurance company, AIG is heavily reliant on its reputation 
(as is Citigroup). I raise the points merely to suggest that the line between highly aggressive 
financial conduct and unlawful financial conduct may be a thin one. 
 119. In re Massey Energy, 160 A.3d. 
 120. There almost certainly were grounds for survivors’ tort claims regardless of the regulatory 
regime. 
 121. In re Massey Energy, 160 A.3d at 487. 
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clear policy to risk the lives of workers in order to maximize corporate 
profit. It was management’s disregard of mine safety practices that led 
to the mine disaster.122 
This case was presented in an interesting posture. Following the 
mining disaster, plaintiffs filed derivative suits to recover Massey’s 
losses from the directors and responsible officers.123 Thereafter, the 
board began to seek a merger partner because of the company’s 
crippled financial position following the disaster, leading to a merger 
of the company into Alpha Natural Resources, Inc.124 The merger 
agreement said nothing about the derivative suits, which passed to 
Alpha in the merger, thus making any judgment equally beneficial to 
Alpha shareholders and Massey shareholders.125 Plaintiffs argued that 
the board should have valued the derivative claim separately, excluded 
it from its assets, and placed it in trust for the Massey shareholders.126 
Thus the case involved an action to enjoin the merger.127 The court 
dismissed the complaint.128 
In order to reach this decision, the Vice Chancellor was required 
to assess the derivative claims themselves, which centrally included a 
Caremark claim.129 He had little trouble finding that the board likely 
had failed to “make a good faith effort to ensure that Massey complied 
with its legal obligations.”130 Enumerating the various red and yellow 
flags waived at the board, including a series of mine safety violations, 
 
 122. This latter conclusion was made by a report commissioned by West Virginia’s governor. 
Id. at 492. While Blankenship’s aggressiveness may have led Massey to appear to be more 
irresponsible than other mine operators, the history of mining regulation is one of continual 
challenges by operators to regulators. In 2009, 27.4% of all violations were appealed, and some 
estimates suggest that mine owners were litigating 67% of all significant violations and penalties. 
Patrick R. Baker, The American Coal Miner, the Forgotten Natural Resource: Why Legislative 
Reforms Are a Viable Solution to Solving the Case Backlog Before the Federal Mine Safety and 
Health Review Commission Sparked by Tougher Enforcement of New Coal Mining Health and 
Safety Laws and Regulations, 13 VT. J. ENV. L. 141, 143–44 (2011). Few changes were made in 
mine safety regulation during the preceding 30 years despite significant technological progress, id. 
at 147, and it has been argued that the rigidity of the Mine Act (and its operation as a strict liability 
statute) stifles the flexibility needed by operators to craft the safety solutions best suited to them. 
Karen L. Johnston, The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977: Is It Suffering from a Mid-
Life Crisis?, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 441, 452 (2001). 
 123. In re Massey Energy, 160 A.3d at 487. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 497. 
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continued adversity to the regulatory authority, repeated flouting of 
mine safety rules, and increases in violations, the court concluded that 
“there seems little doubt that a faithful application of the plaintiff-
friendly pleading standard would preclude a dismissal of [plaintiffs’] 
claims at the pleading stage.”131 The court noted, “a fiduciary of a 
Delaware corporation cannot be loyal to a Delaware corporation by 
knowingly causing it to seek profit by violating the law.”132 
Then-Vice Chancellor Strine was very careful in his articulation 
of his analysis. That does not change what in fact he did. 
The first observation is that, in making his evaluation of the 
Caremark claims, the then-Vice Chancellor bent the line between 
procedure and substance. It has long been a precept of Delaware 
jurisprudence, clearly articulated in the passage from Citigroup quoted 
above and of course in Caremark itself, that courts are to review only 
the procedures by which the board makes its decision, and not the 
substance of that decision. As Chancellor Allen noted: 
What should be understood, but may not widely be 
understood by courts or commentators . . . is that compliance 
with a director’s duty of care can never appropriately be 
judicially determined by reference to the content of the board 
decision that leads to a corporate loss, apart from 
consideration of the good faith or rationality of the process 
employed.133 
Plaintiffs in Massey had alleged the board’s failure “to make a 
good faith effort to ensure that Massey complied with applicable laws 
designed to protect the safety of miners.”134 They further alleged that 
Blankenship and a compliant board and management “fostered a 
business strategy expressly designed to put coal production and higher 
profits over compliance with the law.”135 Going on to challenge the 
board’s good faith, the plaintiffs argued that, “[r]ather than respond to 
numerous red and yellow flags by aggressively correcting the 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. In re Massey Energy Co., C.A. No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *20 (Del. Ch. May 
31, 2011). At the time of the merger, the board had not made a  decision as to whether to pursue 
the derivative claims. Without much discussion, the court appears to have concluded that they 
would survive Rule 23.1 pleading standards no matter what the board’s decision would be or would 
have been. Id. at *21. 
 133. In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 134. In re Massey Energy Co. , 2011 WL 2176479, at *19. 
 135. Id. 
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management culture at Massey that allegedly put profits ahead of 
safety, the Board allowed itself to continue to be dominated by 
Blankenship.”136 
Leaving aside the good faith implications of law violation for a 
moment, what plaintiffs appear to have been alleging is that the board 
made an affirmative business decision to accommodate Blankenship’s 
policy, an observation that is bolstered by the fact that the board took 
no steps to terminate Blankenship as CEO until his interference with 
the merger led his friend and supporter, Inman, to suggest that he leave 
his post. The support for this behavior as an affirmative business 
decision is further supplied by the court’s inference that the board went 
“through the motions” in the face of red flags, making no “good faith 
efforts to ensure that Massey cleaned up its act.”137 Perhaps the 
clearest indication that the court is actually reviewing a substantive 
business decision comes in the following passage describing 
plaintiffs’ allegations: “[I]nstead of using their supervisory authority 
over management to make sure that Massey genuinely changed its 
culture and made mine safety a genuine priority, the independent 
directors are alleged to have done nothing of actual substance to 
change the direction of the company’s real policy.”138 
On the other hand, Chancellor Allen in Caremark: 
That is, whether a judge or jury considering the matter after 
the fact, believes a decision substantively wrong, or degrees 
of wrong extending through “stupid” to “egregious” or 
“irrational,” provides no ground for director liability, so long 
as the court determines that the process employed was either 
rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance 
corporate interests.139 
Stepping back to look at plaintiffs’ allegation, it should be 
apparent that the issue is one of disagreement over a business decision. 
There simply is no discussion of process. Indeed, in evaluating the 
likelihood of the claim’s success, then-Vice Chancellor Strine 
discusses the fact that the board did in fact engage in some sort of 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. Although the board appeared somewhat passive in the face of Blankenship’s 
domination, it is well to remember that “the decision not to act is just as much of a decision as a 
decision to act.” La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 341 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
 138. In re Massey Energy, 2011 WL 2176479, at *19 (emphasis added). 
 139. In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
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monitoring process, which ordinarily would lead to the failure of the 
oversight claim.140 The process brought about no change, but it is 
standard Delaware jurisprudence to acknowledge that the failure to 
make changes is itself a business decision.141 It seems evident that 
plaintiffs are complaining about the board’s refusal to change its 
business policy to one more attractive to the plaintiffs. Then-Vice 
Chancellor Strine apparently accepted this allegation in evaluating the 
claim as one that would withstand a motion to dismiss. 
Even if one were to find a purely process-based evaluation here, 
the evaluation of plaintiffs’ position suggests a breach of a different 
core Delaware precept. The shareholder plaintiffs clearly are arguing 
that the business policy they would have liked the board to pursue was 
superior to the business policy the board actually did pursue. That is a 
legal posture forbidden to shareholders, even in a derivative suit. For 
one of the most unbreakable tenets of Delaware jurisprudence has 
been that it is the board, and the board alone, that makes corporate 
policy.142 No matter how much shareholders may disagree, their only 
meaningful remedy is to replace the board with new members at the 
next annual election.143 Thus the centerpiece of plaintiffs’ complaint 
should have been a non-starter in a Delaware court.144 
This brings me to the alleged legal violations, the hook upon 
which the whole opinion hangs. After all, as Disney, Stone, and other 
cases point out, knowingly causing the corporation to violate the law 
is behavior not in good faith. In light of the confluence of the duty to 
monitor with the duty of good faith,145 one might reply by pointing out 
that the entire Caremark discussion is just good faith in other clothing. 
And yet legal violations are really not the issue here. That is 
where the good faith argument fails as a matter of reality. It is also 
where the Vice Chancellor bent the legal risk-business risk barrier laid 
out in Citigroup. The deaths of the miners, and thus the lion’s share of 
the losses suffered by Massey, were the result of the mine explosion, 
 
 140. In re Massey Energy, 2011 WL 2176479, at *20. 
 141. See, e.g., La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 46 A.3d at 340–41. 
 142. In re Time Inc., C.A. No. 10670, 1989 WL 79880 (July 14, 1989). 
 143. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 144. The court discusses the shareholders’ role in electing directors in the context of an 
assessment of the legitimate losses they can claim to have suffered, suggesting the “justice” of 
shareholders suffering losses having experienced super-normal gains as a result of Massey’s bad 
short-term behavior. In re Massey Energy, 2011 WL 2176479, at *29 n.185. 
 145. Oklan, supra note 3. 
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not a violation of law in the manner contemplated by Caremark and 
Stone. In fact, the Vice Chancellor recognized that the directors and 
officers “could face large liability claims” based on lost mining profits 
as well as settlements with miners’ families and fines.146 Lost mining 
profits are not regulatory fines or criminal penalties. They are not, at 
least here, the result of legal penalties. Moreover, mine safety 
regulations, while they have the teeth of law behind them are based, 
among other things, on best industry practices.147 Those practices 
would exist regardless of whether they were articulated as matters of 
positive law. It was the decision to save money by cutting corners on 
safety standards that led to the mine disaster, not regulatory violations. 
The Massey losses are conceptually and practically different from 
corporate losses arising from the payment of criminal or regulatory 
penalties, as was the case in Caremark and Stone. To see this, imagine 
if federal mine safety regulations were more lax than they were, 
permitting practices that were sub-optimal and posing greater risk to 
miners. This is entirely plausible, and it is in fact the daily work of 
regulatory agencies to make assessments of the costs and benefits of 
regulation. Suppose federal mine safety rules exposed miners to at 
least some of the dangers present at the Upper Big Branch mine. 
Assume that Massey fully complied with these regulations. Or 
suppose there were no regulations at all and Massey pursued an 
aggressive cost-cutting policy leading to underinvestment in ideal (but 
not legally-mandated) safety conditions. In either of these cases, the 
explosion may have happened anyway. If so, the same workers would 
have died, the same claims would have been made by survivors, the 
same loss of profits would have occurred, and the company would 
have suffered the same reputational damage. In fact, looking beyond 
 
 146. In re Massey Energy, 2011 WL 2176479, at *29 n. 185; see also Verified Amended 
Shareholder Derivative Complaint at 51, New Jersey Bldg. Laborers Pension Fund v. Blankenship, 
2011 WL 2176497 (Del. Ch. 2010) (No. 5430-VCS), 2010 WL 2771297 at ¶¶ 139, 141 (consistent 
failure to address poor safety conditions of mines leading to, among other things, reputation loss 
and loss of shareholder value, violations of company’s internal policies, and severe reputational 
harm); Verified Shareholder Consolidated Derivative Complaint at 2–3, 79, In re Massey Energy 
Co. Derivative Litig. (Del. Ch. 2011) (No. 5430-VCS), 2011 WL 190841 at ¶ 1 (board conscious 
of putting profits over safety), ¶ 2(severe reputational harm and loss of shareholder value), ¶ 173 
(disregard of internal as well as external safety regulations), ¶ 174 (board endorsed “patently unsafe 
work conditions in order to minimize cost and maximize output”); Verified Shareholder Third 
Amended Derivative and Class Action Complaint at 31, In re Massey Energy Co., 2017 WL 
1739201 (Del. Ch. 2017) (No. 5430-VCS), 2011 WL 2028545 at ¶ 80 (lost profits from damaged 
mine). 
 147. 30 U.S.C. § 811(a) (West 1979). 
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the legal context, the then-Vice Chancellor himself implicitly 
recognized this: “Subterranean mining will never be a risk-free or 
entirely clean business. That is a reality . . . .”148 Seen this way, the 
real importance of the mine safety regulations at issue in Massey was 
to fit the case into a Caremark framework. The risks undertaken by 
the company were business risks, not legal risks. The losses were a 
result of risky business.149 
Any doubt that a business decision, and hence business risk, was 
at issue was laid to rest by Chancellor Bouchard in the most recent 
iteration of the case decided in May 2017. Dismissing the derivative 
litigation for plaintiffs’ loss of standing as a result of the merger, the 
Chancellor quoted plaintiffs’ characterization of the fiduciary breach 
as defendants’ “causing Massey to employ a deliberate and systematic 
business plan of willfully disregarding both internal and external 
safety regulations,” and noting that the allegations “would state a 
viable derivative claim for relief under Caremark.”150 
To be sure, one cannot say what the analysis of the lawsuit would 
have been in the absence of a regulatory regime. Perhaps the legal 
violations were a necessary hook to allow the court to find likely bad 
faith without appearing to violate fundamental doctrinal principles of 
Delaware jurisprudence. One wonders, however, whether a 
contemporary court would really permit directors to escape liability 
for causing workers’ deaths with the constructive knowledge that their 
business plan was likely to do just that. Such a posture might have 
passed muster in a 19th century court, but surely not today. 
Shorn, then, of doctrinal rhetoric, Massey engaged in an 
evaluation of the very type of business risk the Citigroup court so 
pointedly rejected as part of Delaware jurisprudence. Then-Vice 
Chancellor Strine did the right thing and, in so doing, provided a 
means of infusing Caremark with meaning and giving teeth to the 
notion of a monitoring board. Massey makes business risk reviewable. 
While Massey belongs in its own category as a case decided by a 
Delaware court, another case applying Delaware law to a Caremark 
claim is instructive because of its similarity to Massey. Intuitive 
 
 148. In re Massey Energy, 2011 WL 2176479, at *23. 
 149. This is true even in the case of the miners’ survivors’ damages claims. Businesses regularly 
evaluate the balance between risk, even to life, and profitability, as then-Vice Chancellor Strine 
observed in Massey. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. 
CORP. L. 967, 984 (2009). 
 150. In re Massey Energy Co., 160 A.3d 484, 487–88 (Del. Ch. 2017). 
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Surgical involved plaintiffs’ allegations that the board knew that its 
principal product was defective, took no steps to correct the defect, 
and violated FDA regulations by engaging in covert (unreported) 
recalls.151 Sustaining the complaint against a Rule 23.1 motion to 
dismiss,152 the court identified the damages plaintiffs sought: 
“Defendants’ misconduct harmed Intuitive’s reputation; damaged its 
goodwill with the medical community, commentators, the press, and 
the public; and resulted in a decline in stock price, revenue, and sales 
for Intuitive.”153 
None of these damages are regulatory but are, instead, clear 
business losses. Like the losses in Massey, Intuitive suffered these 
alleged losses in the presence of a regulatory regime. But the losses 
plaintiff alleged could just have well been sustained in the absence of 
such regulation. If Intuitive had concealed its product defects 
(resulting in loss of life) from the medical community, the public, the 
scholars, the commentators, and the press, precisely the same damages 
would have arisen upon the ultimate revelation of the defects and 
concealments. 
Caremark jurisprudence already incorporates review of the 
board’s failure to monitor business risk. All the courts have to do is 
recognize this and make it explicit. 
E.  Discussion 
I’m not so innocent as to suggest that Massey, taken alone, 
represents a change in Delaware jurisprudence. Massey was an easy 
case. The company’s business policy, at least as articulated by the 
court, appears to have been despicable. There were indeed violations 
of law. And the Vice Chancellor did not actually have to rule on the 
Caremark claim itself, only that the allegations in the complaint were 
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, thereby giving the derivative 
claims at least some potential value in the merger. 
There is something far more important that the case does 
represent. Massey suggests that, when pressed by facts it finds 
sufficiently compelling, a Delaware court can do all of the things that 
Caremark jurisprudence says it cannot do. It can consider a business 
 
 151. In re Intuitive Surgical., 146 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 152. This refers to Federal Rule 23.1, not Delaware Rule 23.1, but the court applied Delaware 
law in its analysis. 
 153. In re Intuitive Surgical, 146 F. Supp. 3d at 1114. 
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decision as a business decision. It can even pass judgment on that 
decision. Looking past doctrine to damages in Massey and the blended 
cases paves a way forward to developing doctrine that has the potential 
to give real teeth to the duty to monitor and to make monitoring a 
meaningful directorial occupation. 
Nothing in the nature or function of the monitoring board would 
lead to the conclusion that its only monitoring function is to monitor 
legal risks. The doctrinal limitation to legal risks is disappointing and 
inconsistent with reality. After all, just as judges are not business 
experts, directors are not legal experts. Perhaps legal risks are the most 
externally obvious and easy to identify causes of significant corporate 
financial loss, but neither the Delaware General Corporation Law nor 
the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance, which laid out the case 
for, and established, the modern monitoring board, limit the board’s 
responsibilities to monitoring legal risk.154 Delaware’s statute simply 
states that “the business and affairs of every corporation organized 
under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a 
board of directors . . . .”155 The mandate of the board is powerful and 
broad, giving it the sole responsibility for business decision-
making.156 Limiting the board’s legal responsibilities (or at least the 
extent of its enforceable responsibilities) to monitoring legal risk 
seems, at a minimum, rather inconsistent with its statutory and judicial 
mandate. 
Moreover, the board has changed from the time of Graham v. 
Allis-Chalmers and even Caremark. Not only has it changed from 
managing to monitoring, but it has also evolved from a pastime to a 
real paying job. When Caremark was decided, corporate directors 
earned median base compensation of $33,750 in manufacturing 
companies, $31,700 in non-financial services companies, and $30,200 
in financial services companies.157 Median stock option grants were 
$45,000.158 Median director compensation at the Fortune 500 
companies was $260,200 in 2016 (with cash compensation of 
 
 154. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2008). 
 155. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016). 
 156. See generally Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989); 
Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
    157.   KAY WORELL, CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S COMPENSATION IN 1997: A RESEARCH 
REPORT (The Conference Board 1998). 
 158. Id.  
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$105,000).159 Whatever the legitimacy of the court’s unsubstantiated 
fear of insufficient qualified board candidates may have been, board 
members today are paid real money. In fact an outside director’s 
income solely from a Fortune 500 board seat puts him (or sometimes 
her) in the top 6.6% of American household income.160 While it is true 
that board members are expected to have some expertise in business 
(although the famous exonerated Disney board gives something of the 
lie to that frequent assertion), I suspect that there are many highly 
intelligent business and finance professionals with incomes far below 
that of the typical board member who, with a little training, could serve 
as competent directors and who might have the incentive to do so 
because the money would actually mean something to them. 
After all, a corporation’s legal department, working perhaps with 
an outside legal auditor just as its financial department works with an 
outside auditor, ought to be able to do a better and more 
comprehensive job than the board does, certainly better than is 
expected under the Caremark standard. Why not simply leave in place 
a CEO, monitored by securities analysts and outside experts, and save 
us all the trouble, expense, and litigation of a board in the first place? 
One reason that is often repeated is that somebody is needed to 
monitor the CEO. The previous paragraph gave one possibility for 
accomplishing this goal without a board. Another possibility is the 
web of external regulations in which the board is embedded, 
suggesting compliance regimes and their internal compliance 
requirements provide a new, if troubling, form of corporate 
governance,161 which would focus on legal risk. But the realization of 
legal risk is hardly the only way for a corporation to lose money. 
The argument is often made that directors are part time workers 
(although with significantly higher incomes than most part-timers), 
with full time day jobs and little time to attend to the corporation’s 
affairs. Whatever the legitimacy of this argument in 1963 or even 
1996, the world has changed. Contemporary directors can do so much 
 
 159. Compensation for Outside Corporate Directors Stabilizing, Willis Towers Watson Study 
Finds, WILLIS TOWERS WATSON (July 27, 2017), https://www.willistowerswatson.com/en/press/ 
2017/07/compensation-for-outside-corporate-directors-stabilizing. 
 160. Percentage Distribution of Household Income in the United States in 2016, STATISTA 
(Sept. 2017), https://www.statista.com/statistics/203183/percentage-distribution-of-household-in 
come-in-the-us/. 
 161. Griffith, supra note 3. 
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more in the limited time available. This observation brings me to the 
second aspect of Caremark’s promise. 
II.  THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RED FLAGS 
A.  The Issue 
There are two kinds of red flags present in the cases: internal red 
flags and external red flags.162 As in the case of business risk, 
Delaware jurisprudence already implicitly incorporates the breadth of 
red flags necessary to realize Caremark’s potential. Understanding the 
differences between the two kinds of flags and the relevance of those 
differences is important to evaluating what directors knew or should 
have known about corporate problems and to developing the kind of 
comprehensive doctrine that achieves the level of directorial 
responsibility at which Caremark purports to aim. 
In accepting Caremark as Delaware law, the Supreme Court 
interpreted its standard of knowing indifference to require that 
directors have actual rather than constructive knowledge of the 
corporate conduct at issue in order to sustain liability.163 Because the 
situation of each director is likely to be different and liability appears 
to turn on an individual state of mind, the court describes this as 
requiring a subjective evaluation of each director’s scienter.164 
The actual knowledge requirement is doctrinally a little peculiar. 
Caremark itself was a reaction to the earlier Allis-Chalmers case in 
which the court absolved the board of a duty of inquiry in the absence 
of their knowledge or constructive knowledge of any wrongdoing.165 
Caremark imposed a duty of monitoring that would ensure, or at least 
make more likely, that information about internal illegal conduct 
would reach the board, thus replacing the don’t ask don’t look 
incentive established by Allis-Chalmers with a requirement to have 
information transmission systems in place and to monitor those 
systems.166 In this respect it was a significant advance beyond Allis-
Chalmers. Yet the knowledge requirement has returned.167 Caremark, 
 
 162. See infra notes 163–172 and accompanying text. 
 163. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Arlen, supra note 3. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
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at least in theory, makes it more likely that the board will acquire 
knowledge. 
Doctrinally, this knowledge requirement derives from the notion 
of bad faith. In Stone v. Ritter the court identified two kinds of bad 
faith in the context of oversight liability. The first is found when a 
board “utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system 
or controls.”168 The second occurs when directors’ conscious failure 
“to monitor or oversee” the operations of the monitoring system 
prevents them from being informed.169 “In either case, imposition of 
liability requires a showing that the directors knew that they were not 
discharging their fiduciary obligations,”170 in other words, scienter.171 
A plaintiff can satisfy the knowledge requirement, at least 
sufficiently to withstand a Rule 23.1 motion to dismiss, by pleading 
with particularity the presence of red (and sometimes yellow) flags 
which should have alerted directors to the presence of wrongdoing, or 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. I do not explore the meaning of good faith in depth in this paper because the Delaware 
courts’ reduction of the concept to scienter in oversight cases seems well-established (and because 
my discussion of red flags jurisprudence reveals the potential expansion of the boundaries of 
scienter), conversance with the debate about its meaning during the evolution of the concept as 
judicially applied provides helpful context for understanding the relatively reductive nature of its 
understanding by the courts. The literature on good faith is substantial, although diminished after 
the Delaware Supreme Court’s limitation of the concept in Stone. See Christopher M. Bruner, Good 
Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of Director Liability in Corporate Law, 41 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1131 (2006) (exposing good faith as one of several complicating factors leading 
to jurisprudential confusion and complexity); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter 
and The Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769 (2007) (using good faith to expand 
the spectrum of fiduciary obligation): Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, 
and Structural Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833 (2007) (exploring the manner in which good faith could be 
used to overcome intractable structural bias problems); Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 
89 CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004) (drawing on scienter to give good faith functional meaning); 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006) 
(engaging in a careful analysis of the meaning of good faith and arguing for its normative 
desirability as a matter of Delaware jurisprudence); Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business 
Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1 (2005) 
(analyzing good faith as a rhetorical device rather than a substantive standard); Leo Strine et al., 
Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629 
(2010) (examining good faith’s place in Delaware jurisprudence and noting the expansion of the 
duty of loyalty beyond conflict claims and defining it as the negative duty not to act in bad faith); 
Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Not in Good Faith, 60 SMU L. REV. 441 (2007) (contrasting meaning of 
good faith with “not in bad faith” and arguing that significant substantive consequences follow 
from the language); Elizabeth A. Nowicki, A Director’s Good Faith, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 457 (2007) 
(working to provide a definition of good faith that enhances board accountability). 
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at least sufficient evidence thereof to have stimulated them to attend 
to their monitoring machinery. 
While the court has separated flags by color, it has overlooked a 
more fundamental difference in the nature of the information that 
would underlie them; internal and external information. 
This is understandable. After all, the goal of Caremark internal 
monitoring systems is to discover wrongdoing within the corporation, 
for that is where liability-creating activity occurs. But information 
about the corporation and potential wrongdoing often is generated 
outside the corporation as well, information that is relevant both to 
regulatory losses and to business losses. 
The first type of information, internal information, is generated 
within the corporation, through the conduct and behavior of 
employees in the ordinary course of business, and ideally flows up to 
the board through the monitoring mechanisms required by Caremark. 
Members of the board typically learn of this kind of information at 
board meetings and committee meetings. 
The second type of information is external information. External 
information originates in newspaper articles, government and 
regulatory investigations and reports, television news and 
documentaries, social media like LinkedIn postings, and the like. 
Members of the board currently learn of this kind of information in the 
same manner as does the general public. 
One might expect that directors should be required to be more 
attentive to internal information, given their responsibility to monitor 
the corporation. But, for reasons I will discuss, the contemporary 
monitoring board’s structure and modern technology lead to the 
conclusion that members of the board should be required to be more 
attentive to external information. 
My analysis proceeds in three steps. First is an examination of the 
cases, demonstrating the unacknowledged presence of both types of 
red flags. Then I will explain why the board is more likely to be better 
informed by external information than internal information in the case 
of a misbehaving corporation. Finally, I will discuss the board’s ability 
to channel and receive that information as easily (if not more so) as it 
can obtain internal information. 
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B.  The Cases 
The few cases in which Caremark claims survive a Rule 23.1 
motion to dismiss are instructive. In re China Agritech, Inc.172 
involved a company that essentially was a fraudulent operation for the 
benefit of its founders. This Caremark claim survived largely because 
the Audit Committee and the board were dysfunctional. Yet the Audit 
Committee undertook a formal (if ultimately insufficient) 
investigation of allegations made, among other places, in an 
externally-generated report by a “self-described consultant and private 
investor with more than ten years of business experience” in China 
and Southeast Asia.173 Published on the website 
www.seekingalpha.com, the report went into great detail describing 
the absence of any meaningful business and operations of the 
company.174 While the board appears to have been sufficiently corrupt 
as to need no red flags, and while its investigation of this report was 
cursory and appears to have been predetermined, the report was 
significant to the plaintiff’s establishment of a well-pleaded 
complaint.175 
In Rich v. Chong, another case surviving a motion to dismiss, one 
of three actionable red flags was an externally-generated NASDAQ 
letter threatening the company with delisting if it failed to bring its 
internal systems up to SEC requirements.176 In Saito v. McCall, a 
substantial portion of the defendant board members were put on notice 
following information discovered during due diligence of its merger 
partner, information arguably generated internally but not information 
that would have arisen through the kind of monitoring systems 
contemplated by Caremark.177 In Pyott, one of the most significant red 
flags that the court said should have put the board on notice of internal 
wrongdoing was information provided by the FDA to the company 
about the activities of an outside sponsored speaker at company-held 
 
 172. 2013 WL 2181514 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013). 
 173. Id. at *4. 
 174. Id. at *4–5. 
 175. In re China Agritech is, admittedly, an imperfect case for an example because so much 
bad conduct was going on internally. At the same time, it is only in those cases of really bad conduct 
that Rule 23.1 dismissal motions are sustained. 
 176. Rich ex rel Fuqi Int’l v. Chong, 66 A.3d 963, 984 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 177. Saito v. McCall, No. CIV.A. 17132-NC, 2004 WL 3029876 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 
2004), overruled by Lambrecht v. O’Neal, 3 A.3d 277 (Del. 2010). 
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dinners.178 In Massey, the court cited newspaper accounts of the 
company’s bad behavior as well as an official West Virginia report 
issued after the mining disaster blaming Massey’s management for the 
event and government (externally generated) citations.179 In Abbott 
Depakote, the district court, applying Delaware law, identified 
externally-generated red flags that included a letter from the US 
Department of Justice to Abbott’s law department informing it that the 
DOJ was investigating its off-label marketing of Depakote, directing 
the company not to destroy documents, and informing it that the DOJ 
planned to issue subpoenas.180 The court treated these subpoenas as a 
second red flag and noted that these two “new” red flags (newly 
pleaded after the court’s Rule 23.1 dismissal of an earlier complaint) 
had been waved in the board’s face “or displayed so that they are 
visible to the careful observer.”181 
A final example is Intuitive Surgical, another case surviving a 
Rule 23.1 motion to dismiss, where the court relied on red flags that 
were indisputably external.182 The company had violated FDA 
regulations by, among other things, failing to file required FDA 
reports regarding complaints of defects in its leading product, and 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, including the outside directors, 
both knew of the defects and “authorized or turned a blind eye to three 
covert corrective actions” undertaken by the company.183 The plaintiff 
pled three red flags; two scholarly articles published in medical 
journals reporting on the product failure, and 95 products liability suits 
against the company.184 The court concluded that “it is reasonable to 
infer that scholarly studies evaluating the da Vinci system and its 
performance would be known by the board.”185 
 
 178. L.A. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313 (Del. Ch. 2012) (FDA letters 
were significant red flags in a parallel federal case applying Delaware law). 
 179. In re Massey Energy Co., C.A. No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *7–8 (Del. Ch. May 
31, 2011). 
 180. In re Abbott Depakote, No. 11 C 8114, 2013 WL 2451152, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 2013). 
 181. Id. at *7. A Caremark claim survived a Rule 23.1 motion to dismiss in Saito on grounds 
that the directors had actual knowledge of financial irregularities. In an earlier iteration of the case, 
Ash v. McCall, No. Civ. A. 17132, 2000 WL 1370341 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000), the complaint was 
dismissed without prejudice. I will discuss the red flags at issue below because they technically 
appeared in a dismissed case. 
 182. In re Intuitive Surgical, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 183. Id. at 1111. 
 184. Id. at 1116. 
 185. Id. at 1117. 
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One can wonder whether a Delaware court would go so far as to 
hold outside directors responsible for knowing the contents of 
scholarly medical journals. But that is not important to Intuitive’s 
relevance. Relevant is the fact that the court saw no need to distinguish 
between internal and external red flags, implicitly acknowledging that 
the board is responsible for noticing material information about the 
company regardless of source. 
These examples are of red flags in the few cases where the board’s 
behavior was sufficiently egregious to support a Caremark complaint 
beyond the pleading stage. It is hard to know how significant they 
might independently have been because the patterns of misbehavior 
and corruption in which they were embedded were so severe that it 
would have been hard for a responsible court to have dismissed them. 
Cases dismissed at the pleading stage where such pervasive 
misconduct was lacking follow a similar pattern of including external 
and internal red flags. For example, the court in Horman v. Abney186 
identified four red flags.187 Two of these were internally generated, but 
two were external—an Assurance of Discontinuance Agreement 
imposed by the State of New York and allegations from the City and 
State of New York that the company was not in compliance with the 
AOD.188 The court made no distinction as to the relative relevance of 
the internal and external red flags, dismissing the complaint because 
the board had in fact taken action in response to them.189 In Dow 
Chemical, an external red flag was a publicly alleged bribery 
charge.190 The court, without commenting on its external origin, 
dismissed it as “not a ‘red flag’” because of the unreliability of the 
source.191 All of the alleged red flags in Citigroup were external, 
including newspaper articles, a Bloomberg report, credit-rating 
downgrades by Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s, and a Freddie Mac 
announcement, among others.192 While concluding that the alleged red 
flags had no specific connection to Citigroup and therefore were 
 
 186. C.A. No.12290-VCS, 2017 WL 242571 (Del. Ch. 2017). 
 187. Id. at *10. 
 188. Id. at *3, *10–14. 
 189. Id. at *14–15. 
 190. In re The Dow Chemical Co., No. 4349-CC, 2010 WL 66769, at *12–13 (Del Ch. Jan. 11, 
2010). 
 191. Id. 
 192. In re Citigroup Inc., 964 A.2d 106, 115, 128 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
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insufficient to support scienter, the court made no distinction between 
the sources of these red flags and internally generated information.193 
All of the red flags in Melbourne were external, consisting of 
investigations and the imposition of significant penalties by the 
Korean and Japanese antitrust authorities.194 Interestingly, Vice 
Chancellor Montgomery-Reeves somewhat ambiguously observed 
that she did not need to decide whether these matters actually 
constituted red flags because plaintiffs had failed adequately to plead 
that the Qualcomm board’s response constituted bad faith.195 She went 
on to analyze the complaint on the assumption that they were red 
flags.196 
Four red flags were pleaded in Ash v. McCall,197 three of which 
were external and consisted of a Bloomberg report, two reports by an 
independent institutional investor research organization, and articles 
in The Atlanta Constitution.198 The court again did not distinguish 
between the sources of the red flags, dismissing the complaint because 
they were overcome by “green flags,” positive reports to the board by 
its accounting firm and investment bank, on which the court held the 
board was entitled to rely.199 
The distinction between internal information and external 
information is an important one if Caremark jurisprudence is to realize 
its potential. Contrary to what might be expected, I will argue that a 
requirement that directors pay attention to external red flags at least as 
much as internal red flags is more likely to lead to meaningful 
monitoring. I don’t at all dismiss the duty to monitor internal 
information. After all, this is the kind of information that the board is 
meant to access through internal monitoring systems. But for reasons 
I will discuss, it may well be that external information is more reliably 
 
 193. The court did note that the alleged red flags were little more than “public documents,” but 
the importance of this observation goes to the fact that they “reflected the worsening conditions in 
the subprime mortgage market and in the economy generally” and did not specifically address 
Citigroup’s situation. Id. 
 194. Melbourne Mun. Firefighters’ Pension Tr. Fund ex rel. Qualcomm, Inc. v. Jacobs, No. 
10872-VCMR, 2016 WL 4076369, at *3–4, *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 2016), aff’d, 158 A.3d 449 (Del. 
2017). 
 195. Id. at *9. 
 196. Id.  
 197. Ash v. McCall, No. Civ. A. 17132, 2000 WL 1370341, at *4 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at *9–10. 
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available to the board. It is also technologically rather easily 
accessible. 
C.  Structural Holes and Information Blockage 
I begin by repeating the observation that the average public board 
today is an independent monitoring board, in contrast to the managing 
boards that sat prior to the 1980s.200 This difference marks an 
important distinction in directors’ access to information. In an earlier 
study I explored the theory of structural holes to show how the 
composition of a board affects information control and access.201 In a 
board composed of a mix of inside and outside directors, information 
flows to outside directors both through the CEO and through board 
insiders. These inside directors have their own independent sources of 
information deep within the corporation as a result of their day-to-day 
work and are not solely reliant for their information on the CEO. While 
circumstantial reasons might exist in certain cases for insiders to 
restrict the information they are willing to give their outsider 
colleagues,202 it is theoretically possible, and indeed probable, that 
information flows at least somewhat horizontally around the board. 
In contrast, with a board composed of outsiders except for the 
CEO, information flows to outside directors only one way: through the 
CEO himself. Boards will receive reports from corporate employees, 
but those employees are unlikely to have the kind of independent 
relationships with outside directors that board colleagues will have 
with one other, and are unlikely ever to stray from the script approved 
by the CEO.203 It is, therefore, probable that the information available 
to outside directors will be more controlled and constricted in outsider 
boards than in insider boards. 
AIG presents a case in which cooperation in the active internal 
concealment of information by the CEO204 was probably necessary for 
the insiders to sustain their fraudulent schemes.205 Even a case devoid 
 
 200. Gordon, supra note 8, at 1465, 1475. 
 201. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structural Holes, CEOs, and the Missing Link in Corporate 
Governance, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1313 (2005). 
 202. The fear of being fired might be one. 
 203. Fear of firing again presents itself. 
 204. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. v. Greenberg, 965 A.2d 763, 774, 795–96 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 205. In Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 916–17 (Del. Ch. 2007), the two insiders on the 
board were not recipients of the options at issue. 
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of evidence of actual wrongdoing, like Citigroup,206 presents a 
situation where insiders might prefer to prevent outside directors from 
being fully-informed of their activities.207 
The distinction between types of red flags and the problem of 
structural holes is nicely illustrated by Sandys v. Pincus. Shortly after 
the company completed its IPO, it requested that its underwriters 
waive their lockup provision so that certain employee-shareholders 
(including directors) could participate in a secondary offering of the 
stock.208 It so happened that, at the time of the request and the 
secondary offering, these insiders allegedly knew that the company’s 
financials significantly overstated its financial performance.209 When 
the company restated its financials, the stock price dropped 81 percent 
over a six-month period.210 In dismissing the complaint, the court 
noted that the outside directors had not been given the relevant 
financial information. 
Of course not. If the insiders had disclosed the company’s true 
financial condition to the outsiders as they prepared to sell their stock 
in a secondary offering that significantly overpriced the shares, it is 
likely that a responsible board would have prohibited the offering. 
While Sandys and AIG are extreme, they are good illustrations of the 
problems that outside directors can face when seeking information on 
an almost completely outsider board. Internal information may be 
concealed and thus unavailable. As the cases surveyed in Part II.b 
illustrate, external information may be more plentiful and reliable. 
This analysis shows that it may be more likely that directors on 
independent boards will be put on notice of wrongdoing by external 
red flags than by internal red flags. It is for this reason that I argue that 
boards should be held to a higher explicit expectation of Caremark 
good faith notice by external information. As was true with respect to 
 
 206. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 129 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 207. One reason might be compensation incentives, as in the Goldman case. In re The Goldman 
Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. CIV.A. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 
12, 2011). Citigroup didn’t squarely place the issue of compensation on the table but it is reasonable 
to think that the employee compensation schemes in the two corporations were not dramatically 
different. 
 208. Sandys v. Pincus, No. 9512-CB, 2016 WL 769999, at *3 (Del Ch. Feb. 29, 2016), rev’d, 
152 A.3d 124 (Del. 2016). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at *4. As I noted in Part I, it is interesting to observe that the nature of the derivative 
damages claimed by plaintiffs was unclear. 
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the business decisions I discussed in Part I, the tools already exist in 
the cases. 
The importance of holding outside directors responsible for 
external red flags is underscored by an observation made by the 
Delaware courts themselves. Wrongdoers generally don’t leave paper 
trails.211 This undoubtedly correct observation suggests yet another 
limitation on the utility of internally-generated information. If 
Caremark is to have real teeth or, to put it differently, if the duty to 
monitor is to mean something, it seems as if external red flags are the 
avenue by which this will happen. 
D.  The Duty to Monitor in a World of Information 
The realization that external red flags may provide more and 
better information to independent directors than internal red flags 
leads to further analysis. Courts frequently repeat the assertion that 
independent directors have limited time to give to corporate affairs. It 
is possible that this observation would lead them to demand less of 
directors with respect to external red flags, no matter how much better 
and more available is this kind of information. 
Delaware courts have not done this, in part perhaps because they 
have not acknowledged the distinction. But the analysis is important. 
I certainly do not mean to discourage Delaware courts from expecting 
directors to rely on external red flags. But there is no reason for them 
to be discouraged, even on the assumption that independent directors 
have limited time because, as I shall argue, limited time is all it would 
take for independents to inform themselves of external red flags. Thus 
the facts argue for an enhanced duty to monitor external red flags. 
It is important to be precise about what a heightened requirement 
that directors attend to external red flags would mean. Chancellor 
Chandler wrote in Citigroup that Caremark requires directors to 
ensure that “reasonable reporting and information systems exist that 
would allow directors to know about and prevent wrongdoing that 
 
211.See, e.g., La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 357 (Del. Ch. 2012) 
(“[S]adly, sophisticated corporate actors at times engage in illegal behavior and attempt to hide 
their misconduct with the appearance of legal compliance.”); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. v. Greenberg, 
965 A.2d 763, 795 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“That inference is that those who engage in sophisticated 
forms of financial fraud do their best not to leave an obvious paper trail. Rather, consistent with 
their improper objectives, those at the top of such schemes try to conceal their roles and not leave 
marked paths leading to their doorsteps.”). 
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could cause losses for the Company.”212 This is an objective inquiry 
that necessarily looks at the world beyond doctrinal doors. And 
judicial review of corporate monitoring systems is procedural. Courts 
generally do not evaluate whether the system is a good one or not.213 
That would be a violation of fundamental principles of Delaware 
law.214 Judicial review of the procedures by which a board adopted an 
external red flag monitoring system would be consistent with 
Delaware process jurisprudence. 
The review of the reasonableness of reporting and information 
systems is a matter of process. Directors’ scienter necessary to sustain 
a Caremark claim is said to be a subjective evaluation of directorial 
intent. The two connect where the presence of a reasonable reporting 
and information system brings red flags to directors’ attention, red 
flags which they then disregard at their peril. One can, therefore, 
attribute scienter only to directors who one reasonably would have 
expected to see red flags and act upon them.215 
What may be considered “reasonable” changes over time. 
Behavior that might be considered reasonable in one age may no 
longer be considered reasonable as human knowledge and technology 
develop. Thus, the reasonable driver in control of a 1920 Model T on 
the roadways of that time would perhaps be forgiven for conduct 
considered unreasonable by the driver of any modern automobile on 
any modern city street or highway. A reasonable manufacturer of 
canned food products at the turn of the twentieth century undoubtedly 
faced a different concept of reasonableness than would a similar 
manufacturer today. 
The same might be true for corporate directors, but the courts of 
Delaware have developed the jurisprudence of red flags without 
explicit regard to changes in its own analogue of automotive and food 
safety, the world of information. I don’t think it requires proof to say 
that this world has changed dramatically since Caremark was decided. 
A reasonable reporting and information system in 2017 should be 
expected to be based upon these technological developments. Given 
 
 212. In re Citigroup Inc., 964 A.2d 106, 131 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 213. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“Obviously the 
level of detail that is appropriate for such an information system is a question of business 
judgment.”). 
 214. See id. (referencing the business judgement rule). 
 215. That is to say, if the red flags were waved in the director’s face. Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 
136, 143 (Del. 2008). 
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the importance of external red flags in keeping directors informed, 
directors should be charged with the responsibility of taking advantage 
of this new technology. 
The counter argument will almost certainly be the standard one: 
we do not want drivers and food processors to take risks with our 
safety. We do want directors to take risks. But the objection is 
incomplete. Even with respect to drivers and food processors, we 
balance our desire to diminish their risk-taking with the realities of the 
activity. We want people to drive, so we determine an optimal level of 
safety by roughly calibrating the cost of diminished risk to a point 
beyond which the activity is diminished to unacceptable levels. So too, 
with food processors. So too, with directors. 
All that courts need to do is to balance the risks in light of the 
realities. And the job of Delaware courts in evaluating the manner in 
which boards balance this risk in their specific corporate contexts is 
probably considerably easier than in other tort contexts. While driver 
liability and products liability look to the actual substance of behavior, 
all Delaware courts really need to do is to look at the board process by 
which its reporting and information systems are designed. If the 
process is reasonable in light of the corporation’s business, regulatory 
environment, and overall risk profile, then the inquiry is complete and 
the directors are absolved, unless of course red flags put directors on 
notice of corporate wrongdoing. 
Embracing this reality changes the cost calculus and provides a 
path towards making monitoring more meaningful. A single 
information officer or corporate librarian can easily be tasked with 
creating a system that automatically captures newspaper and 
regulatory agency announcements about their corporations.216 While 
some companies receive more public attention than others, the labor 
is essentially the same and the work is performed automatically and 
mechanically. From a corporate perspective, the accumulation of this 
information is nearly costless. 
But that is not the objection. The objection would be that busy 
directors have no time to read the information. This objection is 
considerably overstated. In the first place, most corporations just don’t 
receive that much press. While Apple generated more than 1,150,000 
 
 216. It is almost certainly the case that corporations already designate this responsibility to one 
or more corporate employees. 
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Google entries in 2016, Publix Super Markets generated only 5,020. 
This may seem like a lot, but a quick tour through the first 10 pages or 
so of Google results for Apple showed nothing that might be relevant 
to a director. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that any news of 
real importance will eventually find its way to the major national 
papers and the principal local papers where the corporation does 
business, thus diminishing the number of sources directors could be 
expected to read. Sorting mechanisms established by a corporate 
librarian would presumably winnow these down considerably. Finally, 
a glance at the headline and the lede paragraph of any article should 
readily allow a director to decide whether it is necessary to read more. 
The amount of labor that is likely to be required is hardly unreasonable 
to expect for a director earning the Fortune 500 average of 
$260,000.217 
It is not my purpose to prescribe the kinds of external information 
reporting systems that any given corporation will adopt, for surely that 
will change with the specific corporation and depend upon factors like 
its size, the nature of its industry, the extent of its regulatory regime, 
the geographical scope of its operations and its sales, and the like. A 
reasonable reporting and information system for Apple will likely be 
different from a reasonable reporting and information system for 
Publix Super Markets, as will a reasonable reporting and information 
system for a corporation in a regulated industry like Caremark. The 
judicial evaluation of what is a reasonable monitoring system for 
external information should focus on the same kinds of board 
processes as are used for evaluating the reasonableness of monitoring 
systems for internal information. 
The concept of “reasonable” has changed. Delaware courts 
should acknowledge this and incorporate it into their jurisprudence. 
Wal-Mart Stores illustrates the ease and importance of acquiring 
this kind of information.218 When The New York Times reported on an 
alleged bribery scheme at Wal-Mart, derivative suits were filed in 
Arkansas and Delaware.219 The Delaware plaintiffs did their 
homework by demanding access to Wal-Mart’s books and records.220 
 
 217. See Chris Morris, Pay Raises for Corporate Board Members Far Outpace Average 
Americans’, FORTUNE (Oct. 18, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/10/18/board-of-directors-pay/. 
 218. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CV 7455-CB, 2016 WL 2908344, at *21 (Del. Ch. May 
13, 2016), supplemented, 167 A.3d 513 (Del. Ch. 2017). 
 219. Id. at *1. 
 220. Id. 
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The Arkansas plaintiffs were less diligent and, before the Delaware 
plaintiffs had arrived at the pleadings stage, were dismissed on a Rule 
23.1 motion by the Arkansas court.221 The Delaware defendants 
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of issue preclusion.222 
Among the questions addressed by the Delaware court was 
whether an Arkansas court would consider a plaintiff who failed to 
demand corporate books and records before filing a derivative suit to 
be an adequate corporate representative.223 Ruling from Delaware law, 
the court decided that an Arkansas court would not view such a 
plaintiff as inadequate, contributing to its decision to dismiss the 
complaint based on issue preclusion.224 
In light of Delaware’s repeated and sometimes strident 
admonitions “to use the tools at hand” to ensure that derivative suit 
pleadings are sufficiently particular, this ruling seems strange. But the 
court seemed to recognize that the tools had changed. The Arkansas 
plaintiffs had not sought books and records from the corporation. 
“But, as their counsel attests, crucial excerpts from a number of 
key documents underlying the New York Times article were available 
on the article’s webpage.”225 In her view, these underlying documents 
“provided sufficient particularized allegations to surmount the 
demand futility hurdle.”226 “Several of the documents from the 
article’s webpage were featured in both complaints, including one of 
the most crucial excerpts from Wal-Mart’s internal reports—the 
statement that ‘there is reasonable suspicion to believe that Mexican 
and USA laws may have been violated.’”227 The court continued, 
“Plaintiffs found that statement important enough to quote it nine 
times in the Delaware Complaint and to feature it in their supplemental 
briefing as well.”228 “This key phrase was included in the excerpts on 
the New York Times website and was relied upon extensively in the 
Arkansas Complaint.”229 
 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at *21. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
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The Arkansas plaintiffs had not used the traditional “tools at 
hand,” the very same tools available at the time of Caremark.230 
Indeed the court remarked that perhaps it would have been better for 
the plaintiffs to have done so, apparently limiting that phrase to refer 
to Delaware section 220.231 But, in an implicit recognition that the 
tools have changed, the court concluded that the Arkansas plaintiffs 
were nevertheless adequate class representatives.232 
III.  CONCLUSION 
As others have observed, the corporate scandals of the turn of the 
century and the corporate irresponsibility that brought about the 2008 
financial crisis have heightened public awareness of the central role of 
the board of directors not only in ensuring good corporate 
management but also, in a broader sense, the smooth and efficient 
functioning of the American economy. While Caremark appeared to 
offer promise, subsequent jurisprudence can lead to the conclusion 
that corporate boards appear generally to have been absolved of 
meaningful monitoring responsibility. Yet the contemporary board 
model and the consequent composition of boards leaves monitoring as 
their job, and demands that they engage in meaningful monitoring in 
order to fulfill it. 
A close look at the cases suggests that Caremark jurisprudence in 
fact has been evolving, at least conceptually, towards the development 
of a meaningful monitoring role. The way has been blocked, however, 
by a relentless judicial and scholarly focus on doctrinal formulae. 
Excavating beneath the doctrine reveals that the elements necessary to 
construct a meaningful monitoring duty already exists. 
It is my hope to have encouraged the Delaware courts to put the 
pieces together. A duty to monitor business risk is already emergent 
 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. It is worth noting a significant asymmetry between the knowledge plaintiffs are expected 
to have to survive a Rule 23.1 motion to dismiss and the knowledge directors are obligated to have 
in monitoring the corporation, a mismatch that favors directors. While plaintiffs are required to 
“use the tools at hand” to discover adequate facts, directors are under no such obligation. To the 
contrary, they are permitted repose until a red flag is ‘waved in their faces.’ Wood v. Baum, 953 
A.2d 136, 143 (Del. 2008). Yet the same technology—the same tools—that have developed since 
Caremark are as available to the directors as to the plaintiffs. In fact, given their respective roles, 
the kind of information relevant to Caremark claims is far easier obtained by boards than plaintiffs. 
And, in light of the dramatic differences in their respective powers and responsibilities to their 
corporations and, indeed, to the economy in which they function, sound thinking would tell us that 
this mismatch is backwards. 
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and should be refined and acknowledged if the monitoring board is to 
have any real meaning. The obligation of directors to be informed 
about their corporations has never been easier to fulfill. Caremark’s 
hidden promise should thus be realized. 
